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Emergency Management for First Nations in Ontario

Nishnawbe Aski Nation
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Executive Summary

Deficiencies and gaps in emergency management for First Nation communities is a significant area of concern in the Province of Ontario. The lack of a tripartite agreement has led to ineffective implementation of Canada's "All-Hazards Approach", and stymied meaningful partnerships between First Nations and the federal and provincial governments. The lack of clear distinction between "emergency" and "disaster" has further contributed to the stalled progression of wholistic and comprehensive emergency management for First Nations in Ontario. As a compounding result, the pillars of emergency management continue to be viewed in isolation of each other rather than through the lens of a disaster cycle.

A thorough analysis of how remoteness intersects with emergency management along with genuine considerations for alternative service delivery models is key to the progression and advancement of First Nation emergency management in Ontario. Establishment of an emergency management system specific to First Nation reserves and culture is necessary for successful emergency management for First Nations moving forward. As a result of this review, the recommendations are as follows:

1. Establish tripartite agreements with First Nation leadership, Provincial Territorial Organizations and/or Tribal Councils that ensure equal partnership among First Nations, the provincial government, and the federal government;
2. Establish clear roles for the federal government, the provincial government, and First Nations in the tripartite agreement;
3. Maintain the distinction between an "emergency" and "disaster", where an "emergency" focuses on institutional response, and a "disaster" focuses on the degree of harm;
4. The definition of "disaster" should be scalable to each individual First Nation, focusing on each First Nation's ability to cope as a benchmark;
5. Eliminate the distinction between social emergencies and other types of emergency hazards, or provide dedicated funding for social emergencies;
6. Create a mechanism to empower emergency declarations by First Nations;
7. Determine the reason for high "response" and "recovery" costs in Ontario;
8. Implement accepted principles of "Build Back Better". This may require going beyond Canada's "Building Back Better Strategy Guide", the "National On-Reserve Emergency Management Plan", and the Emergency Management Assistance Plan "Terms and Conditions";
9. Ensure that all pillars of emergency management are not viewed in isolation of each other. This means conceptualizing emergency management as a "disaster cycle" and all pillars of emergency management are given equal consideration;
10. Contribute more resources to the pre-disaster pillars;
11. Develop remoteness indices/indicators specific to emergency management in Ontario communities;
12. Apply the remoteness indices/indicators to First Nations in Ontario;

13. Determine and accommodate the cost of remoteness as it relates to emergency management;
14. Analyze different methods of service delivery to remote First Nations, including the advantages of having regional offices;
15. Establish a system of emergency management for First Nations that takes into account the inherent differences between First Nation reserves and Ontario municipalities. This includes accounting for the lack of tax base on most reserves;
16. Establish strong ties with host communities;
17. Ensure that pre-disaster funding will be made available for host communities;
18. Establish the optimal support roles for the Provincial Emergency Response Centre (PEOC), Emergency Management Ontario (EMO), and any other stakeholders;
19. Ensure that field officers provide adequate support for First Nations, and consider employing First Nation field officers in place of provincial field officers; and
20. Ensure that First Nations are considered when implementing the recommendations from Auditor General reports.

1. Jurisdiction of Emergency Management on First Nations Land

1.1 Overview

*The Constitution Act, 1867*¹ does not assign emergency management to any head of legislative power. Since emergency management has many provincial attributes, jurisdiction for emergency management generally falls to the province.² Provincial jurisdiction can encompass emergencies related property³, or emergencies to health.⁴ Section 91(24) of the *Constitution Act, 1867* states the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians”. In a 2015 report to the Library of Parliament, the role of the federal government was described as:

Although in the past the purview of Public Safety Canada extended to First Nations reserves, this is not the case today. For the purposes of the *Emergency Management Act*, Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) and Health Canada both have identified emergency management on reserves as a risk related to their departmental responsibilities.⁵

A critical difference between a municipality and a reserve under the *Indian Act* is that a municipality is a creature of provincial statute and derives all its powers from provincial statute.⁶ First Nations under the *Indian Act* are characterized differently, where:

¹ *Constitution Act, 1867* (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, No 5 [*Constitution Act, 1867*]

² Jocelyn Stacey, “Vulnerability, Canadian Disaster Law, and the Beast” (2018), 55 Alta. L. Rev. 853 at 864 [Canadian Disaster Law] citing the *Constitution Act, 1867* ss. 92(8), (13), (16); Brittany Collier, “Emergency Management on First Nations Reserves” (9 November 2015), Publication No. 2015-58-E at page 2, online: Library of Parliament Canada <<https://lop.parl.ca/staticfiles/PublicWebsite/Home/ResearchPublications/BackgroundPapers/PDF/2015-58-e.pdf>>. [LOP EM Report]

³ This would fall under s. 92(13) of the *Constitution Act, 1867*.

⁴ Colleen Flood et al, “Federalism and Health Care in Canada: A Troubled Romance?” (2017) at 1-2, Working Paper, online: <https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/working_papers/17>. [Federalism and Health Care]

⁵ LOP EM Report, *supra* note 2 at 2.

⁶ *R. v Greenbaum*, 1993 CanLII 166 (SCC), [1993] 1 SCR 674.

Although First Nations do not owe their existence to the *Indian Act* or any other statute and that an Indian Band is more than a creature of statute they nevertheless constitute entities that, as Bands and Councils, are regulated by the *Indian Act* and exercise powers in accordance with that Act.⁷

The jurisdictional distinction is important because emergency management laws that apply to municipalities in Ontario will not apply to First Nations.⁸ In Ontario, the *Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act* (EMCPA) outlines emergency management requirements a municipality must abide by. The EMCPA applies to municipalities and does not mention First Nation reserves. This lack of jurisdictional protection from the province regarding First Nations has been discussed in light of COVID-19, where:

While there are opportunities for emergency responses from federal and provincial governments, both Ontario's *Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act* and the federal *Emergencies Act* do not specifically allocate federal financial aid for First Nations communities when declaring a state of emergency. In other words, even in the context of a pandemic or similar scale of emergency, Canadian law does not expressly include Indigenous jurisdictional capacity, despite the constitutional requirement to do so based on treaties and the *Constitution Acts, 1867 and 1982*. Thus, it is left to First Nations to provide leadership without full constitutionally recognized jurisdictional authority, given the occupation of the legislative field by the federal and provincial governments and their control over First Nations' financial and other resources.⁹ [Emphasis added]

This concept is an important consideration moving forward. Consider what had occurred in the health context leading to "Jordan's Principle". Similar to emergency management, healthcare jurisdiction as it relates to First Nations is complicated and does not fit neatly into any head of power, where:

[T]he *Constitution Act, 1867* is not explicit on whether the federal or provincial governments have jurisdiction over health care. Section 92(7) is the only constitutional provision that explicitly defines a branch of health care as a provincial matter, but it is restricted to the "[m]anagement of [h]ospitals". Nevertheless, through judicial interpretation, health care has primarily (though not exclusively) been assigned to provincial jurisdiction. As stated in *R v Schneider*, "[the] view that the general jurisdiction over health matters is provincial ... has prevailed and is ... not seriously questioned." However, the issue of Aboriginal health is further complicated as section 91(24) assigns "Indians" to federal jurisdiction. Thus, whilst both levels of government may provide health care to Aboriginal peoples, it is yet to be determined whether either level of government *must* do so. It speaks volumes that with respect to Aboriginal health, both levels of government have sought to avoid rather than assume responsibilities in this area.¹⁰

The same type of jurisdictional second-guessing and lack of coordination between federal and provincial levels of government could negatively impact service delivery to First Nations in

⁷ *Canada (Attorney General) v Munsee-Delaware Nation*, 2015 FC 366 at para 51.

⁸ Office of the Fire Marshal and Emergency Management, Provincial Emergency Response Plan 2019 (Toronto: Ministry of the Solicitor General, 2019) at 12, online:

<www.emergencymanagementontario.ca/sites/default/files/content/emo/docs/Provincial_Emergency_Response_Plan_2019b_Accessible.pdf>. [2019 EM Plan]

⁹ Colleen M. Flood et al, "Vulnerable: The Law, Policy and Ethics of COVID-19" (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2020) at 58, online: University of Ottawa <https://ruor.uottawa.ca/bitstream/10393/40726/4/9780776636429_WEB.pdf>.

¹⁰ Federalism and Health Care, *supra* note 4 at 15.

the emergency management context.¹¹ However, a November 2020 report by the Office of the Auditor General of Ontario stated:

One area where the province, not municipalities, is responsible for emergency management is the response for First Nations communities experiencing emergencies. The province does this on behalf of the federal government under a funding agreement with it.¹²

Since Ontario has assumed responsibility for emergency management in First Nations, there should not be any issues in this jurisdictional context. There is an omnipresent risk in this arrangement however, where discrete jurisdictional arguments could arise depending on the nature of an emergency. Moving forward, there should be clear guidance on the handling of all emergencies regardless of the nature of the emergency (health or otherwise).

1.2 Agreements with First Nations

In 2018, the Standing Committee on Indigenous and Northern Affairs (INAN) published a report entitled, “From the Ashes: Reimagining Fire Safety and Emergency Management in Indigenous Communities” (INAN Report) which reviewed emergency management practices for Indigenous communities in Canada.¹³ The INAN Report outlined how, in 2014, the federal government assumed responsibility for all costs for on-reserve emergency events.¹⁴ The federal government will now enter into funding agreements, where the federal government provides reimbursement to any provincial or third-party organizations that provide services to assist with emergency management on First Nation lands.¹⁵ Currently, Ontario has a funding agreement with the federal government to respond to emergency events on behalf of the federal government.¹⁶

The INAN Report stressed the importance of tripartite agreements between First Nations, provinces and the federal government for emergency management activities.¹⁷ INAN reasoned that tripartite agreements are important because they clarify various roles and responsibilities of stakeholders for emergency management activities in First Nation communities.¹⁸ A necessary feature of the recommended tripartite agreements is to promote “equal partnerships” between First Nations, provincial governments, and the federal government.¹⁹ The INAN Report also highlighted how there are no tripartite agreements in Ontario for emergency management for First Nations.²⁰

¹¹ Jordan’s Principle was instrumental in conceptualizing the bureaucratic issues funding created when jurisdiction is ill-defined. Health jurisdiction has the potential to be analogous to emergency management.

¹² Office of the Auditor General of Ontario, *COVID-19 Preparedness and Management: Special Report on Emergency Management in Ontario—Pandemic Response* (Toronto: Office of the Auditor General of Ontario, 2020) at 9, online: <www.auditor.on.ca/en/content/specialreports/specialreports/COVID-19_ch1EMO_en20.pdf>. [2020 OAG Report]

¹³ Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Indigenous and Northern Affairs, *From the Ashes: Reimagining Fire Safety and Emergency Management in Indigenous Communities* (June 2018) at 10 (Chair: MaryAnn Mihychuk), online: House of Commons <www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/INAN/Reports/RP9990811/inanrp15/inanrp15-e.pdf>. [INAN Report]

¹⁴ *Ibid* at 14.

¹⁵ *Ibid*.

¹⁶ 2020 OAG Report, *supra* note 12 at 9.

¹⁷ INAN Report, *supra* note 13 at 13-14.

¹⁸ *Ibid*.

¹⁹ *Ibid*.

²⁰ *Ibid* at 12-13.

In 1997, First Nation Provincial Territorial Organization Nishnawbe Aski Nation (NAN), Ontario, and the federal government signed a "Protocol Agreement" (NAN Protocol Agreement).²¹ One of the purposes of the NAN Protocol Agreement is:

To clarify and streamline roles and responsibilities of all government departments, ministries, and other agencies which provide or may provide emergency assistance to NAN First Nations, territories and traditional lands.²²

Another purpose is to address issues outlined in Schedule A of the NAN Protocol Agreement that mainly relate to evacuations.²³ A major focus of the NAN Protocol Agreement is emergency management of forest fires and floods²⁴, although s. 3.2 of the NAN Protocol Agreement seeks to clarify and streamline roles of all stakeholders "which provide or may provide emergency assistance" in NAN territory.²⁵

The "Province of Ontario Emergency Response Plan (2008)" (2008 EM Plan) enshrined the NAN Protocol Agreement as a relevant authority under s. 1.3.1(d).²⁶ The NAN Protocol Agreement is described in the 2008 EM Plan as:

This is a protocol between the Nishnawbe-Aski Nation (NAN), INAC and the Government of Ontario by which NAN is responsible for emergency preparedness, planning and evacuation; the federal government provides support and funding; and the province of Ontario, through Emergency Management Ontario (EMO), provides liaison and coordination with provincial ministries.²⁷

Ontario updated their response plan in 2019 resulting in the "Provincial Emergency Response Plan 2019" (2019 EM Plan).²⁸ There is no mention of the NAN Protocol Agreement nor is there any reference to any agreements with other First Nations in the 2019 EM Plan. It is curious why the 2008 EM Plan includes the NAN Protocol Agreement but the 2019 EM Plan does not. NAN did not agree to deactivate the NAN Protocol Agreement, meaning the Ontario government chose to unilaterally exclude this prior agreement when updating their Provincial Emergency Response Plan. Further, all mentions of agreements relating to First Nations in the 2019 EM Plan only refer to bilateral agreements between Ontario and Canada²⁹ suggesting an overt effort to exclude First Nation partners.

The use of bilateral agreements runs counter to the 2018 recommendation in the INAN Report which clearly recommended that First Nations work with province and Indigenous Services Canada (ISC) as "equal partners" through trilateral agreements.³⁰ Since the NAN Protocol Agreement had been unilaterally abandoned, both governments are actively moving away

²¹ Appendix A [NAN Protocol Agreement].

²² Appendix A at 5, s. 3.2.

²³ Appendix A at 5, s. 3.3.

²⁴ Appendix A at 3-4.

²⁵ Appendix A at 5, s. 3.2.

²⁶ Ministry of Community Safety & Correctional Services, *Province of Ontario Emergency Response Plan (2008)* (Toronto: Ministry of Community Safety & Correctional Services, 2008), online:

<https://web.archive.org/web/20161006231937/http://www.emergencymanagementontario.ca/english/emcommunity/responses_resources/plans/provincial_emergency_response_plan.html#P135_11549>. [2008 EM Plan]

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ 2019 EM Plan, *supra* note 8.

²⁹ *Ibid* at 40, 50, 64, 100.

³⁰ INAN Report, *supra* note 13 at 14.

from the concept of equal partnerships with First Nations as recommended by the INAN Report.

1.3 Recommendations

- Establish tripartite agreements with First Nation leadership, Provincial Territorial Organizations and/or Tribal Councils that ensure equal partnership among First Nations, the provincial government, and the federal government; and
- Establish clear roles for the federal government, the provincial government, and First Nations in the tripartite agreement.

2. Canada's "All-Hazards" Approach and Types of Emergencies

2.1 Overview

Canada uses the four pillars approach to emergency management. The four pillars are:

1. Prevention and Mitigation;
2. Preparedness;
3. Response; and
4. Recovery.³¹

In Ontario, the first pillar is divided into two separate pillars, making it a five-pillar approach.³² This distinction does not have a significant impact since prevention and mitigation still exist in both models. The Emergency Management Assistance Program (EMAP) uses the four pillars to breakdown their funding.³³ Since First Nations are funded from EMAP funding and the federal government uniformly uses four pillars³⁴, this report will use four pillars in its analyses.

The conceptualization of emergencies and disasters consisting of the categories listed above is typical in literature related to disasters and emergencies, and has been referred to as a "cycle" of emergency management.³⁵ What is important for the analysis is that the response and recovery pillars are usually triggered by an emergency event, whereas the prevention and mitigation and preparedness pillars "...emphasize the importance of planning in advance of any emergency event occurring to identify risks and hazards and preventative measures that can be taken to minimize the impact of potential emergency events."³⁶

2.2 All-Hazards Approach in Canada

2.2.1 Definition of All-Hazards Approach

Canada uses an "all-hazards" approach when responding to emergencies.³⁷ This approach is described below:

³¹ Ministers Responsible for Emergency Management, *An Emergency Management Framework for Canada*, 3rd ed, (Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2017) at 7-8, online: <www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/2017-mrgnc-mngmnt-frmwrk/2017-mrgnc-mngmnt-frmwrk-en.pdf>. [EM Framework]

³² 2020 OAG Report, *supra* note 12, at page 9.

³³ Evaluation, Performance Measurement, and Review Branch Audit and Evaluation Sector, *Evaluation of the Emergency Management Assistance Program: Final Report* (Ottawa: Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs, 2017), Project Number: 1570-7/16122, online: <www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-CIRNAC-RCAANC/DAM-AEV/STAGING/texte-text/ev_eema_1521732392261_eng.pdf>. [EMAP Evaluation]

³⁴ LOP EM Report, *supra* note 2 at 2.

³⁵ Canadian Disaster Law, *supra* note 2 at 863-864.

³⁶ EMAP Evaluation, *supra* note 33 at 23.

³⁷ EM Framework, *supra* note 31 at 11.

An all-hazards approach to emergency management recognizes that emergencies can be caused by nature, humans or both. The approach includes four interrelated components that can be applied to all real or potential emergencies: prevention and mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. These four components drive emergency management activities all across Canada, including on First Nations reserves.³⁸

The all-hazards approach is meant to minimize the creation of arbitrary and unhelpful distinctions between types of emergencies. The rationale for an all-hazards approach is “the actions required to mitigate the effects of emergencies are essentially the same, irrespective of the nature of the event”.³⁹ The 2017 Federal Emergency Management Framework (EM Framework) specifically addresses that hazards can be both natural and human caused.⁴⁰

2.2.2 Definitions of “Emergency” and “Disaster”

The 2015 “Emergency Management of First Nations Reserves” Parliamentary Report states the following definition of “disaster”, as cited in the federal Canadian Disaster Database in 2015:

A social phenomenon that results when a hazard intersects with a vulnerable community in a way that exceeds or overwhelms the community’s ability to cope and may cause serious harm to the safety, health, welfare, property or environment of people.

Currently, the Canadian Disaster Database (CDD) defers the definition of a disaster to the 2017 version of the EM Framework. Below are the definitions of disaster and emergency found in this framework:

Disaster

Essentially a social phenomenon that results when a hazard intersects with a vulnerable community in a way that exceeds or overwhelms the community’s ability to cope and may cause serious harm to the safety, health, welfare, property or environment of people; may be triggered by a naturally occurring phenomenon which has its origins within the geophysical or biological environment or by human action or error, whether malicious or unintentional, including technological failures, accidents and terrorist acts.

Emergency

A present or imminent event that requires prompt coordination of actions concerning persons or property to protect the health, safety or welfare of people, or to limit damage to property or the environment.⁴¹

The definition of disaster changed from 2015 to 2017 in the CDD, which now includes human actions or error (although the definition of disaster has remained the same from the Second to Third Edition of the “An Emergency Management Framework for Canada”⁴²). The

³⁸ LOP EM Report, *supra* note 2 at 2.

³⁹ Public Safety Canada, *Emergency Management Planning Guide 2010-2011* (Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2010) at page 60, online: <www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/mrgnc-mngmnt-pnnng/mrgnc-mngmnt-pnnng-eng.pdf>. [2010 EM Planning Guide]

⁴⁰ For a non-exhaustive list of hazards, see: EM Framework, *supra* note 31 at 11-12.

⁴¹ EM Framework, *supra* note 31 at 21-22.

⁴² Ministers Responsible for Emergency Management, *An Emergency Management Framework for Canada*, 2nd ed, (Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2011) at 14, online: <www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/mrgnc-mngmnt-frmwrk/mrgnc-mngmnt-frmwrk-eng.pdf>; EM Framework, *supra* note 31 at 21.

fundamental difference between these two definitions is that disasters focus on the magnitude of harm (i.e. the “ability to cope”), whereas emergencies focus on the suddenness of the event and the need for governmental intervention.⁴³

Since disasters focus on magnitudes of harm, entries into the CDD have thresholds. The criteria for the number affected individuals to constitute a disaster are below:

- 10 or more people killed
- 100 or more people affected/injured/infected/evacuated or homeless
- an appeal for national/international assistance
- historical significance
- significant damage/interruption of normal processes such that the community affected cannot recover on its own⁴⁴

Interestingly, Ontario’s *Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act* defines “emergency” in almost the same way as a disaster in the EM Framework by focusing on magnitudes of harm. The definition of emergency is:

(1)... “emergency” means a situation or an impending situation that constitutes a danger of major proportions that could result in serious harm to persons or substantial damage to property and that is caused by the forces of nature, a disease or other health risk, an accident or an act whether intentional or otherwise; (“situation d’urgence”)⁴⁵

2.3 Social Emergencies

For First Nations in Ontario, there is a separate category of “social emergencies” which trigger certain interventions by governmental and non-governmental agencies. The Mushkegowuk Council was the lead in creating a “social emergencies” protocol. In Ontario’s 2016-2017 Annual Report, the activities related to a stand-alone “Social Emergencies Protocol” are summarized as:

Launched Phase I of the Social Emergencies Actions Plan working collaboratively with First Nations partners, the federal government and Ontario Ministries. A series of two focus groups, including participants from northern and remote First Nations, were held to frame the issues, context, and potential solutions. As well, work began on drafting a protocol between Canada, Ontario and First Nations leadership outlining commitment by the parties to solidify ongoing responses to social emergencies.⁴⁶

In 2017, Phase 2 of the Social Emergencies Action Plan was activated, which included a summit of First Nation stakeholders.⁴⁷

The definition of “social emergency” in the “Nishnawbe Aski Nation Guide for Responding to Social Emergencies” uses the following definition:

An event or situation which carries risk to human health/life, mental wellness, or to the social fabric and well-being of the community. It exceeds the resources and

⁴³ Canadian Disaster Law, *supra* note 2 at footnote 9.

⁴⁴ The Canadian Disaster Database (19 Sept 2019), online: <www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/cndn-dsstr-dtbs/index-en.aspx>

⁴⁵ *Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.9, s.1 [EMCPA]

⁴⁶ Ontario, *Annual Report 2016-2017* (Toronto: Ministry of Indigenous Affairs and Reconciliation, 2017), online: <www.ontario.ca/page/published-plans-and-annual-reports-2017-2018-ministry-indigenous-relations-and-reconciliation>.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

capacities of a community, and requires the immediate response and support of governments, external agencies, and service providers.⁴⁸

Curiously, an earlier draft of this definition was brought forward in March 2017 during a “Social Emergencies Summit”. This definition expressly excluded natural disasters requiring evacuation, where the definition stated:

An event or situation, **with the exception of natural disasters requiring community evacuations**, that exceeds the resources and capacities of a community and requires the immediate response and support of external agencies and service providers.⁴⁹ [Emphasis added]

It is unclear why there is a separate social emergency definition. Most jurisdictions in Canada do not use the term social emergency⁵⁰, nor is there much literature on what exactly a social emergency is and what separates it from other emergencies.⁵¹ Judging from the draft definition of social emergency above, a social emergency is likely meant to encompass emergencies that do not fall under a natural hazard requiring an evacuation. The problem with this definition is that all social emergencies should be categorized as a disaster under the EM Framework, since the threshold for a social emergency and a disaster is the inability to cope with an emergency event. In other words, all social emergencies are disasters, and all disasters are social emergencies.

At this time, there is no dedicated funding for social emergencies. The result is whenever an emergency hazard is labeled as a social emergency, that emergency hazard enters a process that has no financial certainty. Emergency hazards not labeled as social emergencies are funded through the federal government’s EMAP program since the federal government assumed the role of reimbursing costs incurred by emergency hazards.⁵² This creates an absurd situation: if an event happens that exceeds a community’s ability to cope but happens to be labelled as a social emergency, there is no dedicated funding stream to apply to nor any guaranteed assistance structure. Conversely, if that same event is labelled a disaster, EMAP funding and related assistance is available. Since all social emergencies are disasters, there is a needless bifurcation of procedural processes by creating a separate social emergencies

⁴⁸ Nishnawbe Aski Nation First Nations Guide for Responding to Social Emergencies, Working Document.

⁴⁹ Jody Porter, “First Nations Say Suicide Crisis Requires Same Response as Natural Disasters - ‘Social Emergencies Summit’ Aims to Create Template for Government Response in First Nations.” (24 March 2017) online: CBC <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/thunder-bay/social-emergencies-summit-1.4038363>.

⁵⁰ In 2011, the First Nations of Quebec and Labrador Health and Social Services Commission released a report entitled “Implementation Evaluation of the First-Line Social Services Pilot Project in Four Quebec First Nations Communities”. This report uses the term “social emergency” throughout but is mostly related to child-welfare. “Social emergency” is conflated and used interchangeably with “crisis” frequently in this document: First Nations of Quebec and Labrador Health and Social Services Commission, *Implementation Evaluation of the First-Line Social Services Pilot Project in Four Quebec First Nations Communities*, (Wendake: First Nations of Quebec and Labrador Health and Social Services Commission, 2011), online: <www.cssspnql.com/docs/centre-de-documentation/rapport-1re-ligne-eng.pdf?sfvrsn=2>; The Manitoba Red Cross has also used the term in August 2020: Red Cross, *Supporting Communities Facing Social Emergencies* (20 August 2020), online: Red Cross <<https://www.redcross.ca/in-your-community/manitoba/manitoba-news-and-stories/supporting-communities-facing-social-emergencies>>.

⁵¹ Quebec’s Centre Local de Services Communautaires has been using the term “urgence sociale” since at least the late 1970’s. “Urgence sociale” translates to “social emergency”, which may or may not have influenced the concept of “social emergencies” in Ontario. A 1988 literature review of definitions of “urgence sociale” show similarities between what a “social emergency” in Ontario is, and what a “urgence sociale” was in the 1980’s: Rachel Lépin et al, *Pour les CLSC de la région des Laurentides et de Lanaudière: un système d’urgences sociales régional et décentralisé* (Quebec: Université Laval, 1988) at 15-16. online: <www.santecom.qc.ca/Bibliothequevirtuelle/santecom/35567000020716.pdf>.

⁵² INAN Report, *supra* note 13 at 10.

protocol. The impact is the same for both scenarios - the community's ability to cope has been exceeded. A consequence of this bifurcation is if the federal government does not want to fund a disaster, they can label it a social emergency and evade responsibility for providing assistance to that disaster.

There are two options to address this. The first option is to eliminate the social emergency distinction and fold it back into the normal emergency management structure. The second option is to have guaranteed funding and assistance for social emergencies. Without financial certainty, the social emergencies distinction is not useful and potentially detrimental to responding to emergency hazards. An important consideration is that the addition of a separate social emergencies protocol into the typical emergency management regime goes against the all-hazards approach outlined above. The rationale of the all-hazards approach is that "the actions required to mitigate the effects of emergencies are essentially the same, irrespective of the nature of the event".⁵³ The nature of the event is less important than actually responding to the event. The creation of a social emergencies protocol could create potentially arbitrary distinctions between emergency hazards. Adherence to the all-hazards approach would support limiting these distinctions and folding social emergencies back into the federal emergency management regime funded by the EMAP.

2.4 Declarations of Emergency

Declarations of emergency for municipalities and provinces are used to grant extraordinary legal powers outside of normal statutory powers. The process is described as:

The law of disaster response has two key features mirrored at each level of government: (1) the legislated ability to declare a state of emergency; and (2) special delegated powers to respond to the emergency. These features operationalize the "toggle switch" approach to disasters... meaning that these special sets of powers govern during a state of emergency, in contrast to the operation of ordinary legislative requirements that apply at all other times.⁵⁴

Ontario's mechanisms for declaring an emergency are found at ss. 4 and 7.0.1 of the *Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act* (EMCPA). Section 4 focuses on a municipality's ability to declare an emergency, whereas s. 7.0.1 focuses on the province's ability to declare an emergency. For the purposes of this report, s. 4 of the EMCPA will be used in the analysis of emergency powers since the Ontario municipal legislative framework will be used as an analogue to the legislative framework that governs First Nation reserves.

Section 3 of the EMCPA requires a municipality to have an emergency plan. O. Reg. 380/04: STANDARDS (Standards Regulation) outlines the specific requirements for that emergency plan. Section 4 of the EMCPA allows that emergency plan to go into effect by declaring an emergency. Section 4(1) of the EMCPA allows the head of a municipal council to "take such action and make such orders as he or she considers necessary and are not contrary to law to implement the emergency plan of the municipality and to protect property and the health, safety and welfare of the inhabitants of the emergency area".

It is important to think of s. 4 of the EMCPA as a 'toggle switch' mentioned above. The purpose of s. 4(1) of the EMCPA is to empower a head of a municipal council to exercise powers outside of the normal daily decision-making process if it is not contrary to law. Outside of emergency situations, a municipal council can only exercise their power through by-laws pursuant to s.

⁵³ 2010 EM Planning Guide, *supra* note 39.

⁵⁴ Canadian Disaster Law, *supra* note 2 at 871.

5(3) of the *Municipal Act*.⁵⁵ As noted in section 1 of this report, municipalities are creatures of provincial statute and exist solely within the realm of provincial jurisdiction. Reserves exercise their powers within the *Indian Act* - a federal statute. There are no requirements in the *Indian Act* for a First Nation to have an emergency management plan. There is also no equivalent of s. 4 of the EMPCA found in the *Indian Act*, therefore there are no extraordinary legal powers available to a First Nation in an emergency.

Emergency plans on-reserve serve a different function than a municipality. There is no requirement that an emergency plan must be activated to unlock any funding or extra powers. Rather, a First Nation “should activate its emergency response plan(s)” as the first step if there is an EMAP eligible emergency event.⁵⁶ There is no guarantee that a First Nation will have an emergency plan nor have the capacity to create one. A 2017 report on the Emergency Management Assistance Program found the following:

The importance for First Nations communities to have updated and tested emergency preparedness plans is complicated by several factors. First, most communities do not have the capacity or expertise to develop and manage plans on their own. As a result, many choose to contract consultants to develop and help implement emergency plans on their behalf. This method, although more efficient, usually involves the creation of emergency plans that are not specifically tailored to the needs of a community. Second, evaluators heard from some communities that there is a need for an in-house emergency management coordinator to assist in the creation and maintenance of their own plan. Third, in the absence of an imminent emergency threat or identified hazard, there seems to be a lack of interest in engaging in preparedness activities. And finally, most community members seemed confused or unaware of their emergency point of contact and who is responsible for what during an emergency event.⁵⁷

The INAN Report also recognized the lack of capacity to create emergency plans, with many First Nation representatives denouncing the lack of funding for preparedness activities.⁵⁸ INAN noted that First Nation representatives from Saskatchewan and British Columbia expressed that there was little to no funding allocated for the creation and implementation of emergency plans.⁵⁹ The fundamental difference between municipalities and First Nations is the municipal structure requires an emergency plan to unlock emergency powers, whereas First Nations generally do not have emergency plans to begin with. Further, some First Nation’s emergency plans are not specifically tailored to their own needs, contrary to the finding in the INAN Report where “First Nations are in the best position to identify the threats they face”.⁶⁰ If a First Nation does not have an emergency plan tailored to its needs, all threats may not be accurately captured in their emergency plan resulting in a deficient plan, assuming one even exists.

When an emergency event is deemed sufficiently important to a band council, the band council often issues a Band Council Resolution (BCR) addressing the emergency event. Under s. 2(3)

⁵⁵ *Municipal Act*, SO 2001, c 5.

⁵⁶ Indigenous Services Canada, *Building Back Better: Emergency Management Assistance Program Strategy Guide* (Ottawa: Indigenous Services Canada, 2019), online: <www.sac-isc.gc.ca/eng/1534954506773/1535121720820>. [BBB Strategy Guide]

⁵⁷ EMAP Evaluation, *supra* note 33 at 25.

⁵⁸ INAN Report, *supra* note 13 at 15.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid* at 18.; It should also be noted the Ontario First Nations Technical Services Corporation (OFNTSC) is a purveyor of emergency plans to First Nations. These are usually boilerplate plans and lack the specificity required for proper emergency plans. The OFNTSC also provides emergency management education and training to First Nations. An issue with OFNTSC education and training is their offerings are more applicable to First Nations in southern Ontario. As a result, OFNTSC education, training, and emergency plans are deficient for remote First Nations.

of the *Indian Act*, powers conferred to a band are properly exercised when a majority of electors consent to the exercise of that power⁶¹, and powers conferred to a band council are properly exercised when a majority of band councillors consent to the exercise that power at a duly convened meeting.⁶² The Indian Band Council Procedure Regulations (Procedure Regulations) outline the procedures for how band council meetings are conducted, and how resolutions are passed.⁶³ All BCRs bound by the Procedure Regulations must be passed by a majority vote of Councillors⁶⁴ with a quorum present.⁶⁵

Uses for BCRs are wide-ranging, including:

- determining lease rates for properties on reserve lands⁶⁶;
- authorizing the transfer of funds from a settlement agreement into a trust⁶⁷;
- providing guidance for custodial arrangements in childcare⁶⁸;
- providing a stance for sentencing in a criminal matter⁶⁹;
- to remove police from reserve lands⁷⁰; and
- other specific and expansive purposes.

Generally, a BCR is “an act of the government of the First Nation and is done on traditional governance principles or those set out in the *Indian Act* which require a quorum for passing. One can be assured that a BCR is the First Nation speaking.”⁷¹

The 2019 EM Plan outlines how a BCR fits into Ontario’s emergency management scheme where:

First Nations can declare emergencies that trigger the bilateral agreement for emergency response between Ontario and Canada. An emergency declaration from a First Nation does not have any direct links to provincial or federal legislation. Indigenous Services Canada typically requires a band council resolution be made to declare the emergency, but they may verbally declare an emergency if experiencing a telephone or power outage with a band council resolution to follow.⁷²

Based on this, it is unclear what the 2019 EM Plan means when it states that ISC typically requires a BCR to “declare the emergency”. Passing a BCR is not dependent on approval by ISC. An interpretation of this passage could be that ISC requires a BCR to fund emergencies, although the wording in the passage does not explicitly say so. Regardless, BCRs are generally used to indicate emergencies and to authorize potential corrective action by a band council. Lastly, if ISC requires a BCR for a specific reason, a BCR could be used to meet formal requirements.

The importance of the toggle switch regarding extraordinary powers in a municipal/provincial context and in an on-reserve context is critical in understanding the differences between a

⁶¹ *Indian Act*, RSC 1985, c. I-5, s. 2(3)(a).

⁶² *Ibid* at s. 2(3)(b).

⁶³ Indian Band Council Procedure Regulations, C.R.C., c. 950. [Procedure Regulations]

⁶⁴ *Ibid* at s. 18(1).

⁶⁵ *Ibid* at s.6.

⁶⁶ *Canada v Piot*, 2019 FCA 53 at para 10.

⁶⁷ *Taylor et al. v Ginoogaming First Nation*, 2019 ONSC 328 at para 11.

⁶⁸ *M.M-A., P.A., M.D. and A.D. v E.L. v Kuuwanimano Child and Family Services, Attiwapiskat First Nation*, 2020 ONSC 4597 at para 6; *J.E.O. v M.D.*, 2020 ONSC 6106 at para 5.

⁶⁹ *R v Collins*, 2011 ONCA 182 at para 28.

⁷⁰ *R v Suggashie*, 2017 ONCJ 67 at para 11 citing *R. v. Conway* [2006] Q.J. No.2015.

⁷¹ *D.A. v G.H. and Dilico Anishinabek Family Care*, 2021 ONCJ 95 at para 71.

⁷² 2019 EM Plan, *supra* note 8 at 64.

reserve and a municipality declaring a state of emergency. A municipality unlocks powers outside of the normal purview of their daily duties. A reserve does not have any special powers when they declare a state of emergency, nor does it automatically unlock any sort of extra funding.⁷³ A BCR may indicate there is an emergency hazard highlighted by Chief and Council, and a declaration of a state of emergency may be made to increase visibility of this issue. However, declaring a state of emergency on-reserve serves a markedly different function than a municipality. Arguably the most pressing reason to declare an emergency on-reserve is to serve more of a political function than a legal function, serving to draw attention to issues and to communicate potential corrective actions.

The reason for the difference between municipalities and reserves is that the legislative framework for band councils and municipalities shares no likeness for responding to emergency events. Creating a toggle switch mechanism to employ extraordinary legal powers to band councils will not be possible due to the way the *Indian Act* gives legal authority to band councils. Therefore, the toggle switch mechanism will need to be modified to accommodate the difference between reserves and municipalities.

An example of a toggle switch mechanism for First Nations could be the automatic activation of EMAP funding and assistance for a First Nation once they declare that their emergency thresholds have been exceeded. Since disasters are focused on the ability to cope with an emergency hazard, an assessment will need to be done with every First Nation to quantify the thresholds of when an emergency event overwhelms the community thus constituting a disaster. Each threshold for every First Nation will vary due to numerous factors, including:

- remoteness;
- population;
- fiscal capacity; and
- any other relevant considerations.

This hazard assessment should be a part of creating an emergency plan for every First Nation. Each First Nation will then reach an agreement with the federal and provincial government on acceptable thresholds for their community. Since these thresholds will be agreed upon prior to any emergency hazards, when a First Nation declares a state of emergency that surpasses the mutually agreed upon thresholds, the release of funds and assistance would flow automatically. The advantages of this system would be the reduction of ad hoc discretionary decision-making, the establishment of clear and identifiable measures of capacity for First Nations, and produce a tangible result when a First Nation declares a state of emergency. Disadvantages could include the oversimplification of hazards and capacity, and potential disagreements on acceptable thresholds.

2.5 Recommendations

- Maintain the distinction between an “emergency” and “disaster”, where an “emergency” focuses on institutional response, and a “disaster” focuses on the degree of harm;
- The definition of “disaster” should be scalable to each individual First Nation, focusing on each First Nation’s ability to cope as a benchmark;
- Eliminate the distinction between social emergencies and other types of emergency hazards, or provide dedicated funding for social emergencies; and

⁷³ A BCR has the potential to unlock funding, but any BCR declaring an emergency may or may not receive funding depending on ISC’s determinations of that situation.

- Create a mechanism to empower emergency declarations by First Nations.

3. Emergency Management Assistance Program

3.1 Overview

The federal Emergency Management Assistance Program (EMAP) is a program designed to provide funding to support on-reserve emergency management. The program is designed to help build resiliency, prepare for natural hazards, and respond to reserves using the 4 pillars of emergency management.⁷⁴

EMAP has multiple funding programs under the mitigation and preparedness pillars. Ancillary funding streams are the Capital Facilities Maintenance Program and the First Nations Infrastructure Fund. While these funding streams are not specifically tied to emergency management, infrastructure can be built/fixed/maintained that can benefit First Nation emergency management.

3.2 Emergency Management Assistance Program Evaluation (2017)

Funding for emergency management activities is through EMAP. In March 2017, an evaluation of EMAP (EMAP Evaluation)⁷⁵ was released. The following sections highlight some important points found in the EMAP Evaluation.

3.2.1 Response: Ontario's Portion of EMAP Funding

The evaluation spans the 2012-2013 to 2015-2016 fiscal years. The following table is found at page 17 of the EMAP Evaluation⁷⁶:

| INAC Emergency Management 2012-13 to 2015-16 by Region by Pillar (\$000,000) | | | | | |
|--|------------|--------------|----------|----------|--------------|
| Region | Mitigation | Preparedness | Response | Recovery | Total Cost |
| Atlantic | 0.65 | 0.19 | 16.01 | 1.59 | 18.44 |
| Quebec | 0.06 | 0.99 | 1.33 | 0.00 | 2.38 |
| Ontario | 1.16 | 6.93 | 54.70 | 21.93 | 84.72 |
| Manitoba | 0.37 | 1.80 | 56.47 | 11.06 | 69.70 |
| Saskatchewan | 0.84 | 9.12 | 14.80 | 53.94 | 78.70 |
| Alberta | 0.35 | 2.82 | 1.54 | 4.47 | 9.18 |
| British Columbia | 0.07 | 3.15 | 0.98 | 1.35 | 5.55 |
| Northwest Territories | 0.00 | 0.07 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.07 |
| Yukon | 0.00 | 0.20 | 0.02 | 1.13 | 1.35 |

⁷⁴ Indigenous Services Canada, *Emergency Management Assistance Program* (Ottawa: Indigenous Services Canada, 2020) online: <www.sac-isc.gc.ca/eng/1534954090122/1535120506707>.

⁷⁵ EMAP Evaluation, *supra* note 33.

⁷⁶ *Ibid* at 17, table 3.

| INAC Emergency Management 2012-13 to 2015-16 by Region by Pillar (\$000,000) | | | | | |
|--|-------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|
| Region | Mitigation | Preparedness | Response | Recovery | Total Cost |
| Headquarters-Regional Operations | 0.00 | 0.84 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.84 |
| Total: | 3.50 | 26.11 | 145.85 | 95.47 | 270.93 |
| * Does not include expenditures for Search and Recovery or Wildfire Management Services. | | | | | |

Comparatively, Ontario uses a disproportionate amount of EMAP funding. Ontario used 31.27% of the entire EMAP expenditures from 2012-2016. A large portion of the EMAP funding is spent in the response and recovery pillars. For the purposes of the table above, the response pillar is described in the EMAP Evaluation as:

...key activities that are undertaken immediately before an event (public communication), during an event (such as medical assistance or evacuation support), or directly after an event (including damage assessment and reconstruction).⁷⁷

The recovery pillar is described in the EMAP Evaluation as:

... repairing, restoring or rebuilding post disaster conditions to a pre-emergency state or to a level deemed acceptable (including trauma counseling, return of evacuees, reconstruction, economic impact studies and financial assistance), while at the same time considering mitigation enhancements to reduce vulnerability to future similar emergencies.⁷⁸

Between the fiscal years of 2012-2016, there were 16 evacuations⁷⁹ that occurred in NAN territory.⁸⁰ Fourteen evacuations were due to flooding.⁸¹ An example of the cost of an evacuation is an evacuation of Fort Albany and Kashechewan in 2012 which costed \$6.7m⁸², or 12% of the expenditures for the response pillar in the table above.⁸³

Further investigation and access to documents is required to determine why Ontario's costs are significantly higher than other provinces.

⁷⁷ *Ibid* at 25.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*.

⁷⁹ Not including those due to wildfires which is separate from EMAP funding.

⁸⁰ Appendix B [NAN Disaster Table].

⁸¹ The other two evacuations were both due to environmental contamination: Appendix B.

⁸² Canadian Disaster Database, *Kashechewan and Fort Albany* (24 March 2012 to 1 April 2012), online:

<<https://cdd.publicsafety.gc.ca/dtpg-eng.aspx?cultureCode=en-Ca&provinces=9&eventStartDate=%2720120101%27%2c%2720161231%27&normalizedCostYear=1&dynamic=false&eventId=1063>>.

⁸³ This event occurred from March 24 to April 1, 2012, so it is unclear if this was included in the 2012-2013 fiscal year's budget. Since the event started in the 2011-2012 fiscal year, this evacuation could have been included in that year's funding.

3.2.2 Building Back Better

For the following sections, the four pillars will be divided into the “pre-disaster” pillars (Mitigation/Prevention and Preparedness) and “post-disaster” pillars (Response and Recovery).

Building Back Better bridges the gap between recovery and mitigation.⁸⁴ Building Back Better is an important concept in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction⁸⁵ (Sendai Framework), is promoted for Canadian EMAP funding⁸⁶, and has found favour in Emergency Management literature.⁸⁷ The concept has been described by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development recently:

[Building Back Better] generally refers to the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction phase after a disaster to increase the resilience of communities through the restoration of physical infrastructure and societal systems...The emphasis is not only on preventative measures to reduce cost of recovery, but also on incorporating social and environmental improvements for increasing well-being of impacted societies.⁸⁸

Building Back Better is also focused on how the recovery pillar is used to reduce or limit vulnerabilities that existed prior to a disaster where:

Building back better is a now ubiquitous concept in disaster management that highlights the “need to place environmental hazards within the wider contexts of building sustainable communities and not re-creating or exacerbating vulnerabilities.”⁸⁹

The federal government’s “An Emergency Management Framework for Canada” also recognizes the need to Build Back Better to “help overcome past vulnerabilities.”⁹⁰

In emergency management, emergency events belong to a “disaster cycle”, meaning a disaster is only one stage of an ongoing, four-stage social and institutional response.⁹¹ A disaster only represents a point in time when an emergency event occurs, and does not represent all aspects of emergency management. Post-disaster efforts tend to be the areas where most EMAP funding is spent, where the bulk of Ontario’s emergency management efforts from 2012 to 2016 were under the response and recovery pillars.⁹² From 2005 to 2019,

⁸⁴ Canadian Disaster Law, *supra* note 2 at 880.

⁸⁵ United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, *Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030* (Geneva: United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015) at 21, online: <www.preventionweb.net/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf>. [Sendai Framework]

⁸⁶ BBB Strategy Guide, *supra* note 56.

⁸⁷ Canadian Disaster Law, *supra* note 2 at 880; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Building Back Better: A Sustainable, Resilient Recovery after COVID-19” (Paris: OECD, 2020) at 2, footnote 1, online: <https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=133_133639-s08q2ridhf&title=Building-back-better-_A-sustainable-resilient-recovery-after-Covid-19>. [OECD BBB].

⁸⁸ OECD BBB, *supra* note 87 at 2, footnote 1. The federal government’s “Emergency Management Strategy for Canada: Towards a Resilient 2030” uses much of the same language when describing Building Back Better: Public Safety Canada, *Emergency Management Strategy for Canada: Towards a Resilient 2030* (Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2019) at 23, online: <www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/mrgncy-mngmnt-strty/mrgncy-mngmnt-strty-en.pdf>. [2030 Strategy].

⁸⁹ Canadian Disaster Law, *supra* note 2 at 880 citing: Jim Kennedy et al, “The Meaning of ‘Build Back Better’: Evidence From Post-Tsunami Aceh and Sri Lanka” (2008) 16:1 J Contingencies & Crisis Management 24 at 25.

⁹⁰ EM Framework, *supra* note 31 at 8.

⁹¹ Canadian Disaster Law, *supra* note 2 at 863.

⁹² EMAP Evaluation, *supra* note 33 at 12.

it is very clear the response pillar takes up most of all EMAP disbursements by a large margin.⁹³ The EMAP Evaluation therefore recommended increasing support for the mitigation and preparedness pillars⁹⁴, not only for cost-saving measures⁹⁵, but also to develop a more proactive approach to emergency management.⁹⁶ The INAN Report also highlighted the need for increased support for emergency preparedness for First Nation emergency management.⁹⁷

Canada developed a policy document entitled “Building back better: Emergency Management Assistance Program Strategy Guide”⁹⁸ (BBB Strategy Guide). The BBB Strategy Guide seems to miss the point of Building Back Better as a concept. For example, under the heading “Recovery Assistance” in the BBB Strategy Guide, it states:

In the context of the EMAP, recovery refers to the measures taken after an emergency event to repair and restore impacted community infrastructures. This rebuilding phase may include a mitigation component to reduce vulnerabilities. The affected First Nation is responsible for taking the necessary actions to ensure that the community and/or its properties can be restored to pre-disaster condition.⁹⁹ [Emphasis Added]

This assessment is problematic since the concept of Building Back Better is to build structures better than before, not to “pre-disaster” condition. Similarly, the “Contributions for Emergency Management Assistance for Activities on Reserve: Terms and Conditions” (EMAP Terms and Conditions) state:

Eligible repair and restoration costs include the actual costs required for repairing or restoring an item or facility to its immediate pre-disaster condition as the maximum amount eligible. In the case of permanent repairs or replacement to better than pre-disaster condition, the amount eligible may be no greater than the amount required for restoration, repair or replacement to the immediate pre-disaster condition as estimated by a technical authority acceptable to the department in addition to any eligible mitigation measures as described below.¹⁰⁰

Building to pre-disaster condition implies the restoration and reconstruction phases will focus on building to the status quo pre-disaster, thus inheriting the same vulnerabilities prior to the disaster. Building Back Better in this scenario would actually mean reducing or eliminating prior vulnerabilities.

⁹³ Indigenous Services Canada, *Graph of Costs Incurred* (8 Aug 2019), online: Government of Canada, <<https://www.sac-isc.gc.ca/eng/1560363002018/1560363016109>>.

⁹⁴ EMAP Evaluation, *supra* note 33 at v.

⁹⁵ The EMAP Evaluation states that “literature suggests that mitigation measures are expected to provide an estimated \$4 in subsequent disaster loss reduction for every \$1 spent”: EMAP Evaluation, *supra* note 33 at 18. The INAN Report also uses the same figures as the EMAP Evaluation, where \$1 spent in preparedness and prevention results in a savings of \$4 in response and recovery: INAN Report, *supra* note 13 at 14. The 2030 Strategy states the return on investment for prevention/mitigation activities could result in savings up to \$6 for every \$1 spent in prevention/mitigation: 2030 Strategy, *supra* note 88 at 17.

⁹⁶ EMAP Evaluation, *supra* note 33 at 19.

⁹⁷ INAN Report, *supra* note 13 at 15.

⁹⁸ BBB Strategy Guide, *supra* note 56.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ Government of Canada, *Contributions for Emergency Management Assistance for Activities on Reserve: Terms and Conditions*, (Ottawa: Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada/Indigenous Services Canada, 2020) online: <www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1386012167936/>. [EMAP Terms and Conditions]

It is important to note both the BBB Strategy Guide and the federal government's "National On-Reserve Emergency Management Plan" (On-Reserve Plan)¹⁰¹ both recognize the Sendai Framework as a guiding document for emergency management for First Nations in Canada. A problem is the BBB Strategy Guide focuses on the recovery pillar as an opportunity to build back to pre-disaster condition, whereas the Sendai Framework presents the recovery pillar as a critical opportunity to Build Back Better through increasing capacity to reduce future disaster risks.¹⁰² While the BBB Strategy Guide does outline some mitigation measures, it does not highlight the importance of those mitigation measures. The On-Reserve Plan outlines Canada's commitment to the Sendai Framework through "enhancing preparedness and recovery to build back better following a disaster."¹⁰³ The exact details of *how* Canada will do so is not laid out in the On-Reserve Plan. The BBB Strategy Guide does not explicitly contain information on what can be achieved through preparedness as mentioned in the On-Reserve Plan.¹⁰⁴ The BBB Strategy Guide instead opts only for vague descriptions of how mitigation can be used for Building Back Better.

It is clear there is a lack of attention to the entire disaster cycle in the BBB strategy. Commitments to Building Back Better seem misguided, unclear, and underdeveloped. More attention must be paid to best implement Building Back Better outside of current practice.

3.2.3 Conclusions from the EMAP Evaluation

The EMAP Evaluation provides valuable insights into some of the areas of improvement for the EMAP program. One of the main conclusions is the EMAP program spends most of its funding on the response pillar in Ontario, with the recovery pillar taking up the second most amount of funding. There is a large funding disparity between those post-disaster and the pre-disaster pillars. As the EMAP Evaluation mentions, "[i]n Ontario, the province's emergency management involvement on-reserve is focused on the response pillar."¹⁰⁵ Focusing mainly on the response portion of the EMAP is not in line with the concept of Building Back Better. A possible reason for the lack of spending in the pre-disaster pillars could be due to a lack of awareness of the mitigation and preparedness funding streams. The EMAP Evaluation found many First Nations did not know about funding for mitigation and preparedness projects.¹⁰⁶ The INAN Report also found deficiencies in funding for preparedness specifically, which prompted a recommendation to the House of Commons to ensure the needs of First Nation preparedness are met.¹⁰⁷ Since the pre-disaster pillars are often underused under the EMAP program, enhancing pre-disaster pillars will bolster First Nation emergency management and increase community resilience.

Lastly, a central problem with the BBB Strategy Guide is a severe lack of connection between what Building Back Better is as a general concept, versus what the EMAP provides for First Nations. The recognition of Building Back Better in the On-Reserve Plan and the BBB Strategy

¹⁰¹ Indigenous Services Canada, *Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada National On-reserve Emergency Management Plan* (Ottawa: Indigenous Services Canada, 2017) at 4-5, online: <https://www.sac-isc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-ISC-SAC/DAM-EMPL/STAGING/texte-text/emergency_plan_1496943857348_eng.pdf>. [On-Reserve Plan]

¹⁰² Sendai Framework, *supra* note 85 at 21-22. It should be noted the 2030 Strategy does expand on Building Back Better as it relates to the Sendai Framework in a Canadian context. However, there is a lack of guidance on what Building Back Better would look like for First Nations and how to integrate it into the current First Nation emergency management regime: 2030 Strategy, *supra* note 88 at 23-24.

¹⁰³ On-Reserve Plan, *supra* note 101 at 4-5.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid* at 5.

¹⁰⁵ EMAP Evaluation, *supra* note 33 at 12.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid* at 19.

¹⁰⁷ INAN Report, *supra* note 13 at 15-16.

Guide shows only that Canada understands that Building Back Better is a concept used in emergency management. The lack of meaningful guidance of *how* to Build Back Better shows that implementing this concept has proven to be a challenge for the federal government. The lack of funding dedicated to pre-disaster pillars is a testament to the lack of adherence to Building Back Better. Moving forward, there should be a focus on how to implement Building Back Better outside of the narrowly prescribed situations outlined in the BBB Strategy Guide and EMAP Terms and Conditions.

3.3 Recommendations

- Determine the reason for high “response” and “recovery” costs in Ontario;
- Implement accepted principles of “Build Back Better”. This may require going beyond Canada’s “Building Back Better Strategy Guide”, the “National On-Reserve Emergency Management Plan”, and the Emergency Management Assistance Plan “Terms and Conditions”;
- Ensure that all pillars of emergency management are not viewed in isolation of each other. This means conceptualizing emergency management as a “disaster cycle” and all pillars of emergency management are given equal consideration; and
- Contribute more resources to the pre-disaster pillars.

4. Measuring Remoteness for First Nations in Ontario

4.1 Different Approaches to Remoteness

Definitions of “rural” and “remote” differ depending on context. In some contexts, there is another category of “northern” communities.¹⁰⁸ The inherent difficulty in defining these terms is exemplified in the follow passage from a 2011 Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care report:

From the onset of the Panel’s work, it was recognized that the terms “rural”, “northern” and “remote” are difficult to define. Across Ontario the degree of each is relative. Rurality can be measured on a sliding scale, and demarcation between rural and non-rural areas may be both unclear and rapidly changing. For the north, it includes both urban and remote populations widely dispersed over vast geography.¹⁰⁹

The complexity of these terms means there can be overlap between definitions, especially since northern can overlap with both urban and remote populations due to how a government at the time demarcates planning districts.¹¹⁰ Creating an arbitrary line of what constitutes a northern community does not measure the impact of service delivery. It also does not contribute to the analysis of spatial distances relative to mode of travel (i.e. fly-in reserves due the lack of year-round road access).

In 2011, Natural Resources Canada and Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada captured remoteness as:

¹⁰⁸ “Northern” is often used in the healthcare context: Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, *Rural and Northern Health Care Framework/Plan: Stage 1 Final Report* (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2011) at 7-8, <www.health.gov.on.ca/en/public/programs/ruralnorthern/docs/report_rural_northern_EN.pdf>. [2011 OMHLTC]; Registered Nurses Association of Ontario, *Coming Together, Moving Forward: Building the Next Chapter Of Nursing Workforce Report* (Toronto: Registered Nurses Association of Ontario, 2015), at 12-13, online: <https://rnao.ca/sites/rnao-ca/files/RR_May8.pdf>.

¹⁰⁹ 2011 OMHLTC, *supra* note 108, at 25.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid* at 8.

1. Any community not currently connected to the North-American electrical grid nor to the piped natural gas network; and
2. Is a permanent or long-term (5 years or more) settlement with at least 10 dwellings¹¹¹

This definition was used to catalogue the communities in Canada that are not connected to a larger electrical grid or piped natural gas network, and it focuses largely on energy consumption and the impact of having an unconnected supply of consumables. This definition inadvertently focuses on connectedness in a general sense and can be useful in identifying challenges faced by communities who face issues related to basic infrastructure.

Another phrase used to describe remoteness has been “isolated communities”, which focuses on the ease of travelling to those communities. For example, the Nutrition North Canada program requires the following for eligibility into the program:

[L]ack year-round surface transportation (no permanent road, rail or marine access), excluding isolation caused by freeze-up and break-up that normally lasts less than 4 weeks at a time.¹¹²

For the purposes of a the H1N1 outbreak in 2009, the Public Health Agency of Canada attempted to delineate and create definitions of remote and isolated. In the discussion of the differences and considerations for separate definitions, the Public Health Agency of Canada wrote:

The definition of “remote” should include a specified distance and/or specified travel time required from the community to the nearest community with an acute care hospital.

The definition for “isolated” should be distinct in defining the access to the community (whether reached by air only, water only, and how this changes during the year). Communication access should also be considered.¹¹³

“Isolated” is used to gauge ease of access, whereas “remote” is the actual distance between a service center (i.e. an acute care hospital) and the community.

4.2 Problems with Past Definitions of Remoteness

The term “northern” is arbitrary and should not be used. The problem with using northern is that it does not provide a clear picture about accessibility. For example, a place like Fort William First Nation could be considered northern, but does not have the same access issues as Fort Albany First Nation.

Using connectedness to an electrical grid or a pipeline can be useful in measuring whether a place is considered remote at a very high level. The main problem with equating access to pipelines or an electrical grid is that it does not necessarily give a clear picture about

¹¹¹ Government of Canada, *Status of Remote/Off-Grid Communities in Canada*, (Ottawa: Natural Resources Canada/ Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 2011) at 1, online: www.nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/files/canmetenergy/files/pubs/2013-118_en.pdf.

¹¹² Nutrition North Canada, *Eligible Communities* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2020), online: www.nutritionnorthcanada.gc.ca/eng/1415540731169/1415540791407.

¹¹³ Public Health Agency of Canada, *Considerations for Definitions of “Remote” and “Isolated” in the context of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009* (Ottawa: Public Health Agency of Canada, 2009), online: https://web.archive.org/web/20091118023500/http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/alert/alerte/h1n1/guidance_lignesdirectrices/cdrpc-cdeicp-eng.php.

accessibility either. For example, Ramsey, Ontario has a population of 4000+ but is 203km from Sudbury with year-round road access, and is south of Chapleau and north of Sudbury. As of 2011, this community was off grid, but it was still on rail lines and had year-round road access. This shows that this metric does not capture ease of access.

The bifurcation of “remote” and “isolated” can be helpful if there is a way to make a clear distinction between distance (remote) vs. access (isolated). Functionally, these two definitions seem to capture two separate ideas which may or may not be opposed. Without clear guidance on the thresholds of where distance becomes remote or where lack of access becomes isolated makes these terms generally unhelpful.

4.3 Index of Remoteness

Statistics Canada has been developing an Index of Remoteness which was originally released in May 2017¹¹⁴, but has been updated and available to the public since April 3, 2020.¹¹⁵ This data set uses the 2016 census data to create values (RI values) from 0 (least remote) to 1 (most remote) which calculates the level of remoteness for census subdivisions. RI values do not have much meaning unless they are put into a comparative context. Otherwise, RI values are simply numbers between 0 and 1. One problem with the methodology with the index of remoteness is that it is not tailored to any specific purpose. In order for remoteness to be accurately measured, RI values must be tied to what they are trying to measure where “[a]ny application of the remoteness index to education, health care or any other specific services is problematic since the [Index of Remoteness] does not measure the proximity to any of the specific service provision centres.”¹¹⁶

4.4 Conclusion

Remoteness will undoubtedly effect the delivery of emergency management services in Ontario. How these effects will manifest will vary by degrees of remoteness. For example, having uniform emergency standards across all Ontario First Nations may not be feasible since remote or very remote communities may not have the infrastructure or capacity to maintain these standards. For example, Kashechewan First Nation and Fort Albany First Nation have collectively been evacuated 11 times since 2012.¹¹⁷ These First Nations are both fly-in communities and this poses challenges for evacuation compared to places with easier access.

Moving forward, attention should be paid to how remoteness interacts with the common paradigm of contemporary emergency management. Focus should also be on how well Ontario’s emergency management system accommodates remoteness. Consideration should be paid to places like British Columbia which have multiple regional offices to help serve communities¹¹⁸, where Ontario does not.

¹¹⁴ Allesandro Alasia et al, *Measuring remoteness and accessibility –A set of indices for Canadian communities* (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2017) Cat. No. 18-001-X, online: <www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/18-001-x/18-001-x2017002-eng.htm>.

¹¹⁵ Minister responsible for Statistics Canada, *Index of Remoteness*, (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2020), Cat. No. 17-26-0001 online: <www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/17-26-0001/172600012020001-eng.htm>.

¹¹⁶ Bakhtiar Moazzami, “Remoteness Indicators and First Nation Education Funding” (Ottawa: Assembly of First Nations, 2018) at 11, online: Assembly of First Nations <www.afn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Remoteness-report.Final_.May7-2018.pdf>.

¹¹⁷ Appendix B.

¹¹⁸ 2020 OAG Report, *supra* note 12 at 45.

4.5 Recommendations

- Develop remoteness indices/indicators specific to emergency management in Ontario communities;
- Apply the remoteness indices/indicators to First Nations in Ontario;
- Determine and accommodate the cost of remoteness as it relates to emergency management; and
- Analyze different methods of service delivery to remote First Nations, including the advantages of having regional offices.

5. Ontario's Role in Emergency Management

5.1 Overview

Jurisdiction for emergency management is perceived as being primarily under provincial jurisdiction. Provinces should then have the infrastructure and capabilities to respond to emergencies. The EMAP Evaluation outlined the role of provinces:

Provinces and territories are key partners to develop and sustain a robust emergency management structure that can tackle both localized and large-scale emergency events. Provinces and territories govern their respective emergency management organizations and coordinate response activities, conduct planning and research, provide training and administer and deliver the disaster financial assistance programs in their jurisdiction. INAC provides assistance and support to the provinces to manage emergencies that have the potential to threaten the health and safety of First Nations communities and individuals. INAC enters into collaborative service agreements with provincial governments to provide First Nations communities with access to comparable emergency assistance services available to other residents in their respective province. Through these agreements, INAC is able to cover eligible costs related to emergency assistance in First Nations communities provided by the provincial government emergency infrastructure.¹¹⁹

A 2015 Library of Parliament report described the role between the federal and provincial governments:

INAC negotiates agreements with provincial and territorial governments for the delivery of emergency management services to First Nations communities. These agreements aim to clarify roles and responsibilities and ensure that First Nations receive services comparable to those available to provincial residents. Eligible emergency management costs provided by First Nations, provincial/territorial governments, and/or third parties are reimbursed by INAC.¹²⁰

In short, the federal government provides funding to provinces to use their existing emergency management system, and this system will be used to service First Nations. An underlying assumption of this arrangement is that the provincial system is sufficiently robust and capable of providing adequate services to First Nations. As a result, emergency management for First Nations can only be as good as the province's emergency management system, but has the potential to be worse.

¹¹⁹ EMAP Evaluation, *supra* note 33 at 10.

¹²⁰ LOP EM Report, *supra* note 2 at 3.

5.2 Ontario's Emergency Management System

5.2.1 Role of Municipalities

Ontario uses a “bottom-up approach” to emergency management, where municipalities are mostly responsible for emergency hazards.¹²¹ The bottom-up approach emphasizes the roles of individual communities and individual citizens when responding to emergency hazards. The federal On-Reserve Plan reflects this bottom-up approach by stating the responsibility for emergency hazards starts at an individual level, then moves to each successive level of government as the ability to cope with the emergency hazard diminishes.¹²²

As discussed in section 2.4 of this document, the EMCPA lays out a framework that municipalities must follow for emergency planning. In this structure, the municipality is mostly left to fund emergency management activities themselves¹²³, but can apply for funding post-disaster through the “Municipal Disaster Recovery Assistance” (MDRA) program if certain criteria are met. An important criterion for the MDRA is the cost of the disaster must be at least equal to 3% of the municipality's own purpose taxation levy.¹²⁴

Ontario's emergency management structure focuses heavily on normative views of how Ontario municipalities function. The implicit assumption is that municipalities can generate money through property taxation which then can fund emergency management activities.¹²⁵ Most First Nations do not have any sort of property taxation regime¹²⁶ resulting in an incompatibility with Ontario's emergency management system. Property taxation on First Nation lands can only occur through two different legal mechanisms: a First Nation can establish property taxation by-laws through s. 83 of the *Indian Act*, or they can opt-in to the *First Nations Fiscal Management Act*¹²⁷ (FNFMA) which requires being added to the Schedule of the FNFMA in order to make taxation laws under the FNFMA framework.¹²⁸

Currently, there are no First Nations in Ontario who have a property taxation by-law under s. 83 of the *Indian Act*.¹²⁹ There are 3 First Nations in Ontario with “Telephone Companies Taxation” by-laws under the *Indian Act*¹³⁰, which are by-laws that tax telephone companies operating on reserve land.¹³¹

¹²¹ 2020 OAG Report, *supra* note 12 at 9.

¹²² On-Reserve Plan, *supra* note 101 at 6-7.

¹²³ The onus is largely on the municipality to have sufficient funds budgeted and insured for emergencies, where “it is important that municipalities consider maintaining sufficient reserves and appropriate insurance coverage to manage the costs of disasters, within their capacity.”: Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, *The Ontario Municipal Councillors Guide 2018: Chapter 12. Emergency management and disaster financial assistance* (Toronto: Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, 2018), online: <www.ontario.ca/document/ontario-municipal-councillors-guide-2018/12-emergency-management-and-disaster-financial-assistance>.

¹²⁴ Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, *Guidelines to apply for Municipal Disaster Recovery Assistance (MDRA)*, (Toronto: Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, 2019), online: <<https://www.ontario.ca/page/guidelines-apply-municipal-disaster-recovery-assistance-mdra>>.

¹²⁵ INAN Report, *supra* note 13 at 12.

¹²⁶ As of 2020, only 30% of 624 First Nations have established taxation on their reserves: First Nations Tax Commission, *Taxpayers: Property Taxation on Reserve* (Kamloops: First Nations Tax Commission, 2020), online: <<https://fntc.ca/property-taxation-on-reserve/>>.

¹²⁷ *First Nations Fiscal Management Act*, SC 2005, c 9. [FNFMA]

¹²⁸ *Ibid* at ss. 2(1), 2(3).

¹²⁹ The information about which communities had property taxation laws and bylaws were provided by the First Nations Tax Commission. Copies of laws and by-laws are available online at the First Nations Gazette: First Nations Gazette, online <<https://fng.ca/>>.

¹³⁰ Fort Severn First Nation, Kasabonika Lake First Nation, and Lac La Croix First Nation.

¹³¹ First Nations Tax Commission, *Section 83 Toolkit: Specific Activity or Services Options* (Kamloops: First Nations Tax Commission, 2020), online: <<https://fntc.ca/specific-activity-or-service-options-s-83-toolkit/>>.

Out of 302 First Nations in the Schedule of the FNFMA, 123 First Nations (40.7%) have established taxation on their lands.¹³² Only 50 First Nations in Ontario have been added to the Schedule of the FNFMA.¹³³ In Ontario, 5 First Nations have Telephone Companies Taxation by-laws under the FNFMA.¹³⁴ There are only 3 First Nations in Ontario with Property Assessment/Taxation laws under the FNFMA: Chippewas of Georgina Island First Nation, Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point First Nation, and Wasauksing First Nation.

To summarize, only 3 First Nations have a property taxation regime in Ontario, and 8 First Nations only tax property used by telephone companies. This means the majority of First Nations in Ontario do not have access to the same property tax revenues that municipalities do. The INAN Report recognized that most First Nations do not have the capacity to fund emergency management activities and are thus reliant on federal funding for emergency preparedness.¹³⁵ The distinction between municipalities and First Nations' abilities to fund emergency management activities is important since Ontario's emergency management system is predicated on municipalities having a tax base to fund their community-level emergency management program. Remoteness, compounded with a lack of a tax base, poses significant challenges to First Nations in Ontario, since there is a geographical hurdle coupled with a financial hurdle to being prepared for and responding to emergencies.

There also seems to be no funding opportunities other than the MDRA for small communities to enhance their emergency management systems pre-disaster in Ontario. In British Columbia, there is a "Community Emergency Preparedness Fund" which assists First Nations and other local communities for funding for various preparedness initiatives.¹³⁶ There is no similar fund in Ontario to help fund the needs of smaller communities that are unable to support a fulsome emergency management program in their community.

5.2.2 Host Communities and Evacuations

When an emergency hazard requires evacuation of a community, the Ontario Joint Emergency Management Steering Committee document "Service Level Evacuation Standards" (JEMS Standards) is used to coordinate the roles of host communities and other stakeholders.¹³⁷ The JEMS Standards outline the roles and responsibilities of many provincial ministries when a community is evacuated. For the purposes of this report, the roles of each Ministry will not be analyzed.

When communities are evacuated, evacuees are usually brought to municipalities. In the context of First Nation evacuations, host communities provide meals, health care and personal support services to evacuees. Host communities are expected to operate on a cost-recovery

¹³² Indigenous Services Canada, *First Nations Fiscal Management* (Ottawa: August 2020), online: <www.sac-isc.gc.ca/eng/1393512745390/1591985622069>.

¹³³ FNFMA, Schedule.

¹³⁴ Atikameksheng Anishnawbek First Nation, Beausoleil First Nation, Chippewas of Rama First Nation, Nipissing First Nation, and Serpent River First Nation.

¹³⁵ INAN Report, *supra* note 13 at 12.

¹³⁶ The program is funded by the British Columbia Provincial Government and is administered by the Union of BC Municipalities. As of September 2020, the funding streams include evacuation route planning, structural flood mitigation, flood risk assessment, flood mapping, flood mitigation planning, emergency support services and emergency operations centres and training. All First Nation communities are eligible to apply: Union of BC Municipalities, *Community Emergency Preparedness Fund Emergency Support Services 2021 Program & Application Guide* (Richmond: Union of BC Municipalities, 2020) at 1, online: <www.ubcm.ca/assets/Funding~Programs/LGPS/CEPF/CEPF-2021-ESS-Program-Guide.pdf>.

¹³⁷ Office of the Fire Marshal and Emergency Management, *Joint Emergency Management Steering Committee (JEMS) Service Level Evacuation Standards* (Toronto: Office of the Fire Marshal and Emergency Management, 2021). [JEMS Standards]

basis, where the host community will pay for the costs of hosting evacuees until they are reimbursed by ISC within 90 days of submitting receipts.¹³⁸

One issue with the cost-recovery model is that costs are incurred up-front by a host community. Incurring expenses up-front may act as a deterrent for host communities. For First Nations that have more frequent evacuations, such as Kashechewan First Nation due to yearly flooding¹³⁹, the importance of establishing mutual agreements about hosting before an evacuation occurs is critical for a smooth evacuation. This may prove to be more difficult if host communities have not actively budgeted to absorb hosting costs until reimbursement by ISC.

An additional concern is the overreliance of ex post facto determinations by the federal government when deciding to provide funding to host communities. For example, if a host community is planning and preparing to initiate their host community procedures to receive evacuees, and the evacuation is ultimately not necessary, there may be no reimbursement by ISC. This is despite the fact that the host community incurred expenses in order to prepare and is contrary to JEMS Standards and direct municipal agreements. This situation actively disincentivizes communities to properly prepare for evacuations since it is uncertain if their efforts will be reimbursed.

The above scenario is not hypothetical. On April 13, 2021, there was a threat that Kashechewan could be evacuated, but did not evacuate as anticipated. The PEOC activated procedures for 4 host communities to be on standby to receive potential evacuees. ISC responded that they were not going to reimburse the preparation costs, claiming they did not authorize PEOC to activate those host sites. ISC further stated that host sites would not be eligible for funding for preparation. An issue arises in this situation where 4 host communities are saddled with preparation costs without any reimbursement, potentially dissuading any of those 4 host sites from preparing themselves to host in the future. Even more alarming that ISC would not defer the activation of host sites to the PEOC, despite the PEOC's role as a coordinating body that is meant to be quick and responsive to potential emergency hazards in Ontario. Eventually, on April 17, 2021, ISC decided to reimburse the host communities for their preparations. This situation demonstrated a lack of coordination between governments and an overall lack of certainty for funding, which may dissuade host communities from continuing to host, or deter potential host communities from ever hosting.

The situation above is more egregious considering evacuations due to flooding have happened many times before in Kashechewan. These evacuations are regular enough to be anticipated annually. By now, one would expect an efficient emergency management protocol for Kashechewan flooding, specifically. It is clear this level of efficiency has not been reached. It is also imperative to consider that communities are not obligated to be host communities. Any deterrents to becoming a host community, whether financial or administrative, will have detrimental effects for evacuees. There will be a point where it is either too expensive or too administratively complicated for a community to be a host community, and it is important to lift the financial and administrative burdens.

The JEMS Standards seeks to resolve some funding issues. A section in Chapter 3 titled "Advancing Funds" outlines that:

¹³⁸ *Ibid* at 57.

¹³⁹ Appendix B.

A municipality that requires start-up funding to prepare to act as a Host Community or requires interim funding in order to sustain its operations during a hosting event, may request advance funding from ISC.¹⁴⁰

A 2021 addition to this section reads:

Interim invoices can be submitted to ISC as well for faster reimbursements. Timely and accurate invoice submissions are important for prompt reimbursements.¹⁴¹

Two inferences can be drawn from these provisions. The first is that there is clearly a need for host communities to be able to have interim funding. The ability to provide interim invoices highlights the reality that communities could become financially constrained midway through hosting. The second is there is funding available by ISC for preparations to act as a host community, but the funding is dependant on a determination by ISC since municipalities “may request” advance funding for start-up costs.

Funding is, and will always be, an ongoing concern. If all host communities could fund all evacuations front-to-end, there would be no need for interim funding. If all communities had funds to prepare to be a host community, there would be no need for start-up funding. Interim funding make sense since it is difficult to foresee how long an evacuation may be, therefore interim funding bridges that gap. A problem with start-up funding is that it is entirely a discretionary decision by ISC. There are no guarantees a host community will receive start-up funding, and the disagreement about funding host communities’ preparations for Kashechewan act as an alarming example.

Lastly, it seems logical that providing funding to host communities to prepare for evacuees should rightly fall into the preparedness pillar. The EMAP Evaluation displayed a massive imbalance for funding in pre-disaster pillars.¹⁴² The INAN Report was clear that preparedness is an issue for emergency management for First Nations.¹⁴³ It is therefore nonsensical not to fund preparedness activities. In the case of Kashechewan, a foreseeable annual flood zone, it is especially nonsensical to push back against preparedness initiatives when the hazards are well-known. The core of the problem is the current emergency management system has an inherent insistence on spending most funding in the post-disaster pillars. The cost-recovery model forces funding to be spent in the post-disaster pillars by the very nature of the system being a cost-recovery model. The fact that host communities rely on decision-making by ISC to receive start-up funds also creates a system where preparedness initiatives are stifled by discretionary, and potentially arbitrary, determinations by ISC officials. The effect of these stifled preparedness initiatives further increases spending on greater response and recovery costs¹⁴⁴ which host communities are expected to incur up-front in the cost-recovery model.

5.2.3 Emergency Management Ontario and Provincial Emergency Operations Centre

Ontario uses the PEOC as a hub for emergency management. The PEOC is authorized by the Standards Regulation under the EMCPA.¹⁴⁵ The intended purpose of the PEOC is to “enable a centrally co-ordinated provincial response to emergencies, where [Emergency Management Ontario] can work with its partners: ministries, municipalities and the federal government,

¹⁴⁰ JEMS Standards, *supra* note 137 at 21.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴² EMAP Evaluation, *supra* note 33 at 17, table 3.

¹⁴³ INAN Report, *supra* note 13 at 15.

¹⁴⁴ *Supra* note 95.

¹⁴⁵ O. Reg. 380/04: STANDARDS

jurisdictions outside of Ontario, and others.”¹⁴⁶ Since established in 2015, the Ontario government claims the PEOC has been mainly used “to respond to First Nations emergencies such as flooding, to assist municipalities during emergencies and to host meetings.”¹⁴⁷

In November 2020, the Auditor General of Ontario released a report entitled “COVID-19 Preparedness and Management: Special Report on Emergency Management in Ontario—Pandemic Response” (“2020 OAG Report”).¹⁴⁸ This report highlights some of the problems with EMO and the role of the PEOC. One issue was the lack of field officers in Ontario compared to other provinces. Ontario had one field officer per 1.8 million residents (1:1,800,000), compared to 1:137,000 in British Columbia and 1:273,000 in Alberta.¹⁴⁹ Another metric found in the 2020 OAG Report is the field officer to municipality ratio. At the time of the 2020 OAG Report, there was only 10 field staff to support 444 municipalities¹⁵⁰, or 1 field officer to every 44 municipalities. There are 133 First Nations in Ontario¹⁵¹, meaning there are 577 distinct communities in Ontario. Therefore, there is 1 field officer for every 13 First Nations, and 1 field officer for every 58 communities in Ontario. The 2020 OAG Report also highlighted lack of staffing for the PEOC generally.¹⁵²

This lack of field officers in Ontario should be read in tandem with the following finding in the EMAP Evaluation:

One key informant recommended improving engagement between field officers and First Nation community leaders when planning for potential emergencies. Evaluators did not find direct evidence of any level of communication during non-events. Not having an adequate and updated emergency management plan, compounded by inadequate communication with First Nations communities on expected actions before an emergency event, substantially increases the risks to all community members and will most certainly have a negative impact on activities related to the response and recovery pillars of emergency management.¹⁵³ [Emphasis Added]

This highlights a significant problem within the EMAP program. Most field officers tend to only deal with First Nations during an emergency. This is reflected in the JEMS Standards, where during an evacuation, field officers “will only remain in communities as long as their assistance is required and/or until responsibility for the situation transitions fully to the federal government.”¹⁵⁴ The 2019 EM Plan outlines how a field officer fits into the deployment of provincial representatives to an affected community where:

During an emergency, a provincial representative may be deployed to a community as a liaison, to provide emergency management support and advice. The PEOC is

¹⁴⁶ 2020 OAG Report, *supra* note 12 at 10.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid* at 12.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid*.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid* at 9.

¹⁵⁰ 2020 OAG Report, *supra* note 12 at 30.

¹⁵¹ Indigenous Services Canada, *Indigenous Communities in Ontario* (Ottawa: Indigenous Services Canada, 2020), online: <www.sac-isc.gc.ca/eng/1603371542837/1603371807037>.

¹⁵² 2020 OAG Report, *supra* note 12 at 30.

¹⁵³ EMAP Evaluation, *supra* note 33 at 25.

¹⁵⁴ JEMS Standards, *supra* note 137 at 8.

responsible for coordinating the deployment of the provincial representative. This representative will frequently be an OFMEM Field Officer, but depending on the scale of emergency additional staff may be requested from within the provincial ERO.¹⁵⁵

As outlined in the 2019 EM Plan, field officers are not to direct any community response or recovery activities, but to provide advice and assistance for the following:

- Facilitating contact with ministry offices where normal community/provincial linkages are not available (for example outside of normal business hours);
- Initiating a request for provincial assistance;
- Canvassing other communities to identify resources that might be made available.¹⁵⁶

The JEMS Standards outlines some of the support field officers provide to host communities, which is largely consists of coordination, and there is no guarantee the field officers will be deployed in every event.¹⁵⁷ In 2021, the JEMS Standards were updated where support from field officers can now be deployed virtually¹⁵⁸, meaning there is an even greater chance that field officers may not appear in-person in the field.

In the 2020 OAG report, it was found during the COVID-19 pandemic that field officers in Ontario could not provide the same level of direct assistance to municipalities as field officers in other provinces¹⁵⁹, and calls to municipalities were continually decreasing in frequency with no taking of minutes of those calls.¹⁶⁰ Some municipal officials provided direct comments in the 2020 OAG Report on the lack of support and performance from EMO and field officers during COVID-19, including:

- “There were a number of municipalities like myself who have never been through this process before and our leadership teams and Council were looking to us as the experts on how the process worked and we received no help from our field officer.”
- “Essentially, the only benefit EMO and our field officer has been is to raise questions to the appropriate ministry with no guarantee of response.”
- “I have significant concerns after seeing the lack of a co-ordinated response and support during COVID-19 about the ability of EMO or the [EMO Centre] to manage/coordinate and direct a response in a potential nuclear event,” (note: EMO and the Ministry of the Solicitor General is directly responsible for the emergency response to a nuclear event).¹⁶¹

In many ways, the function of field officers as it relates to emergency management for First Nations in Ontario, and the EMO generally, is to coordinate stakeholders. The 2020 OAG Report went in depth to describe why EMO’s coordination abilities for municipalities are lacking and need improvement.¹⁶² Given the above, it is difficult to discern the benefit of having provincial field officers providing support to First Nations given their lack of personnel and inability to provide meaningful attention to communities.

¹⁵⁵ 2019 EM Plan, *supra* note 8 at 68.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid* at 68-69.

¹⁵⁷ JEMS Standards, *supra* note 137 at 6,8,26.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid* at 6, 26.

¹⁵⁹ 2020 OAG Report, *supra* note 12 at 31.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid*.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid* at 31-32.

¹⁶² *Ibid* at 27-34. These criticisms will not be outlined here due to the comprehensive and nuanced nature of the analyses found in the report.

It is also alarming that out of the 29 newly approved positions at EMO, from 2017 to the time of the 2020 OAG Report, 11 of those were funded by ISC. This means that 37% of the newly created positions at EMO were created to service 23% of the total number of communities in Canada.¹⁶³ At the time of release of the 2020 OAG Report, only 18 of those 29 positions were filled.¹⁶⁴ It is unknown if the ISC funded positions to assist First Nations are also being used to assist municipalities in Ontario. Regardless of whether the ISC positions also assist municipalities, these ISC funded positions would be better used outside of the EMO context. An example would be to hire First Nation field officers in place of more EMO staff.

To summarize, there is a severe lack of staffing at a provincial level, the emergency management regime is uncoordinated, and the overall utility of Ontario field officers is questionable. It is clear that emergency management in Ontario for municipalities needs improvement in many areas, as outlined in the 2020 OAG Report. The cumulative effects of poor emergency management in Ontario, coupled with the other deficiencies outlined in this report, create a deficient emergency management regime for First Nations in Ontario.

5.2.4 Ontario's Emergency Management System – 2017 to 2020

It is clear from the 2020 OAG Report that since the Auditor General's 2017 audit of Ontario's emergency management regime, there has been a lack of meaningful progress on recommendations put forward by the Auditor General.¹⁶⁵ Since only 11% of the recommendations from the 2017 audit of emergency management have been implemented¹⁶⁶, the pace of Ontario's emergency management improvements are a concern for First Nations. Since Ontario's emergency management system is predicated on being a bottom-up approach, the lack of support to municipalities and small communities also raises concerns for First Nations. As noted in section 2.4 of this report, there are capacity issues for First Nations being able to create a strong, localized emergency management program. As a result, Ontario's emergency management system seems ill-prepared to support First Nations, which will have a most significant impact on those which are remote.

5.3 Recommendations

- Establish a system of emergency management for First Nations that takes into account the inherent differences between First Nation reserves and Ontario municipalities. This includes accounting for the lack of tax base on most reserves;
- Establish strong ties with host communities;
- Ensure that pre-disaster funding will be made available for host communities;
- Establish the optimal support roles for the Provincial Emergency Response Centre (PEOC), Emergency Management Ontario (EMO), and any other stakeholders;
- Ensure that field officers provide adequate support for First Nations, and consider employing First Nation field officers in place of provincial field officers; and
- Ensure that First Nations are considered when implementing the recommendations from Auditor General reports.

6. Summary

This review represents the first step in identifying and resolving the issues that limit First Nation emergency management. While the negative effects of the current pandemic have

¹⁶³ 133 First Nations communities/577 total communities in Canada = 23.05%.

¹⁶⁴ 2020 OAG Report, *supra* note 12 at 30.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid* at 3.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid*.

been experienced by all, nowhere have longstanding issues been exacerbated more than for First Nations trying to manage emergencies, while simultaneously protecting their citizens from COVID-19. We have also seen that the way to get through this pandemic is to work together in a meaningful way, with common goals, adequate resources and mutual support. While numerous gaps were identified throughout this review, there is also an abundance of opportunities to enhance comprehensive First Nation emergency management. If these opportunities are not explored, many First Nations will not only continue to suffer from faulty emergency management practices, but will also remain stagnant as the rest of the Province progresses within the realm of emergency management. The need for robust and comprehensive First Nation emergency management will continually increase. It is therefore imperative that the problems identified within the report be addressed in a meaningful way to enhance capacity, to increase resiliency, and most importantly, to further reconciliation.



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
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Appendix A



Nishnawbe Aski Nation
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Protocol Agreement
on
Emergency Response and Evacuations

This Protocol Agreement is made on the 18th day of April, 1997.

BETWEEN: *Nishnawbe-Aski Nation represented by the Grand Chief on behalf of NAN First Nations (hereinafter referred to as "NAN")*

- and -

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada as represented by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (hereinafter referred to as "DIAND")

- and -

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario as represented by the Ministry of Natural Resources (hereinafter referred to as "MNR") and by the Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services (hereinafter referred to as "MSGCS")

Regarding emergency preparedness and response because of the threat of forest fires and floods to NAN First Nation reserves and traditional lands.

WHEREAS *the NAN First Nations wish to ensure that the authority of the First Nation government (Chief and Council) to declare emergencies related to forest fires or floods is recognized; and, that such recognition is incorporated in the community preparedness and evacuation plans; and in the implementation of preventative measures.*

AND WHEREAS the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development has existing responsibilities under the Emergency Preparedness Act to ensure emergency plans are in place at First Nations communities, and to ensure prompt, coordinated responses are applied to affected traditional land and territories;

AND WHEREAS the Ministry of Natural Resources has existing responsibilities for evacuation plans and response related to forest fires and floods under the Forest Fire Prevention Act and the Provincial Planning Act;

AND WHEREAS the Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services has existing responsibilities for monitoring, coordinating, and assisting in the formulation and implementation of emergency plans and for ensuring that such plans are coordinated with other levels of government and their agencies under the Emergency Plans Act;

AND WHEREAS the Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services discharges these responsibilities through its operating branch, Emergency Measures Ontario (hereinafter referred to as "EMO")

AND WHEREAS the agreement dated March 6, 1991 between MNR and DIAND with respect to the prevention and control of forest fires on reserve lands, and the agreement dated April 10, 1992 between the EMO and DIAND with respect to extending emergency assistance to First Nations communities, were negotiated without the knowledge of NAN First Nations;

AND WHEREAS the parties desire to clarify, affirm and communicate to all levels of government and their agencies, the authority of Chief and Council to declare a state of emergency, and to initiate a first response for an emergency caused by forest fire and flood affecting their traditional territory or lands;

AND WHEREAS the parties desire to work collectively in a spirit of cooperation and mutual respect for each others' responsibilities;

AND WHEREAS the Far North Fire Management Program is a "work in progress" and will, when implemented, provide for prevention measures including fire surveillance and suppression actions;

THEREFORE THE PARTIES AGREE:

1.0 PRINCIPLES

- 1.1 To ensure the health and safety of First Nations and protect First Nation land values in respect to forest fire or flood emergencies consistent with existing approved fire management and flood management policies.
- 1.2 The First Nation Government is the primary authority for community evacuation planning and emergency response and, its local authority is hereby respected under this protocol.
- 1.3 The Parties shall, from time to time, monitor, evaluate and execute appropriate changes in content and process within existing and future agreements to ensure that all aspects of this Protocol are respected, communicated and conditions adhered to.
- 1.4 Nothing in this Protocol will prevent any NAN First Nation from entering into any agreement with Canada or Ontario for such purposes.

2.0 MISSION STATEMENT

The NAN First Nations, Canada and Ontario, the parties to this Protocol, agree to work collectively in a spirit of cooperation and mutual respect for each others' roles and responsibilities, on the issues of fundamental concern in regards to emergency preparedness and planning resulting from flood and fire emergencies.

3.0 PURPOSE

- 3.1 *To maximize the input and expertise available within NAN First Nations, Tribal Councils, NAN political organization and all parties of this agreement with respect to the implementation of this Protocol for the benefit of all NAN First Nations.*
- 3.2 *To clarify and streamline the roles and responsibilities of all government departments, ministries, and other agencies which provide or may provide emergency assistance to NAN First Nations, territories and traditional lands.*
- 3.3 *To resolve and implement those concerns and issues listed in **Schedule A** which have been identified by First Nations' experiences through their emergency response plans.*

4.0 COMPOSITION

The structure of this agreement will consist of representatives from the parties to this Protocol as follows:

- ▶ *NAN First Nations - Chiefs and/or designated Councillors*
- ▶ *Tribal Councils - one Representative each from the following:*
 - *Independent First Nation Alliance*
 - *Keewaytinook Okimakanak*
 - *Matawa First Nations*
 - *Mushkegowuk Council*
 - *Shibogama First Nations Council*
 - *Wabun Tribal Council*
 - *Windigo First Nation Council*
- ▶ *Saugeen First Nation - Chief and/or designated Councillor*
- ▶ *Canada - DIAND District Directors (NAN area):*
 - *Western, Sioux Lookout and Sudbury Districts*
- ▶ *Ontario - MNR Eastern and Western Fire Region Program Managers (NAN area)*
 - *MNR District Managers (NAN area):* • *Red Lake, Nipigon, Cochrane, Timmins, Hearst, Sioux Lookout, Chapleau, Kirkland Lake*
 - *EMO representative*

*All NAN First Nations are party to this Protocol as listed in **Schedule C**.*

5.0 MEETINGS

- 5.1 *The Chiefs, or designates of the NAN First Nations and government representatives who are members or party to this Protocol, will meet from time to time to review, evaluate and fulfil the Mission Statement and to receive documents or reports which identify the individual directions and collective strategies undertaken for the implementation of this Protocol.*
- 5.2 *Meetings shall take place as required but a minimum of one meeting per year with each meeting being no less than one day in length.*

6.0 PROCEDURES

- 6.1 *Upon the occurrence of an emergency at the First Nation community which requires an immediate response to protect the health, safety, welfare and property of community members, the Chief and Council has the authority to declare a state of emergency and to implement their emergency plan.*
- 6.2 *The Chief and/or designated Councillor will convey in writing such declaration of emergency situation(s) to adjacent First Nation communities including first level of contacts within Ontario Ministries and Federal Departments as identified in the community and MNR district emergency response plans.*
- 6.3 *The Chief and Council through their emergency response plans will identify, decide and arrange for the reception site (ie, a traditional location, another First Nation community or a southern municipality).*
- 6.4 *The Chief and Council will request additional emergency assistance from Ontario and Canada in accordance with service responsibilities identified in Schedule B.*
- 6.5 *The Chief and Council, and their identified personnel, will coordinate all emergency procedures in cooperation with Provincial and Federal Ministries to ensure the timely and successful evacuation, care and return of its community members in order to minimize the social and cultural impacts of those affected by the evacuation.*
- 6.6 *The Chief and Council may submit proposals pertinent to costs occurred during*

the state of emergency to appropriate ministries or departments for review or reimbursement in accordance with Section 7.0.

- 6.7 The Chief and Council will provide to all signatories of the protocol agreement copies of community evacuation plans where they exist.*
- 6.8 Where no community evacuation plans exist or where the implementation of such plans put human life at risk, other signatories to this agreement will take such action as is within their area of responsibility to protect life and property. Such action will be undertaken with the full knowledge and co-operation of the community affected.*

7.0 RESOURCING AND IMPLEMENTATION

The participating NAN First Nations will access financial and human resources to implement this Protocol from, but not limited to, the external government departments, ministries and agencies as follows:

CANADA

- *Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development*
- *Emergency Preparedness Canada*
- *Health & Welfare Canada*
- *Department of National Defence*

ONTARIO

- *Ministry of Transportation*
- *Ministry of the Environment and Energy*
- *Ministry of Health*
- *Ministry of Community & Social Services*
- *Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services*

OTHER AGENCIES

- *Nishnawbe-Aski Police Services*
- *Other First Nation Organizations*

MSGCS shall not be liable for reimbursement of any costs under this Agreement except to the extent MSGCS is specifically funded by DIAND and other federal agencies or departments with respect to such costs.

MSGCS will provide such human resources as it is able to coordinate with the cooperation, support and assistance of appropriate provincial ministries and federal departments.

The OMNR may from time to time commit human resources to the renewal and implementation of this agreement.

8.0 ROLES and RESPONSIBILITIES


*8.1 The successful undertaking of emergency preparedness, response and evacuation planning is conditional to the clarity in the definition of roles and responsibilities of all parties involved in fire and flood emergencies. Therefore, all government departments, ministries and agencies which provide emergency assistance to NAN First Nations in accordance with assigned special responsibility areas, are outlined in **Schedule B**.*

9.0 AMENDMENTS


This Protocol is subject to amendment from time to time as agreed to by the participating NAN First Nations and government representatives.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties hereto have signed this Protocol at Thunder Bay,
Ontario, this 18th day of April, 1997.


SIGNED, SEALED AND DELIVERED
IN THE PRESENCE OF:


Brian Davey

ON BEHALF OF NAN FIRST NATIONS


Grand Chief Charles Fox
Nishnawbe-Aski Nation

SIGNED, SEALED AND DELIVERED
IN THE PRESENCE OF:


Richard Y. W. Chong
authorized by the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada


HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT
OF CANADA


John Donnelly, Regional Director General as
authorized by the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada


SIGNED, SEALED AND DELIVERED
IN THE PRESENCE OF:


Trevor Woods


HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT
OF THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO


Jack McFadden, AFFMB Director
as authorized by the Ministry of Natural
Resources for the Province of Ontario

SIGNED, SEALED AND DELIVERED
IN THE PRESENCE OF:


Gary Kerron

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT
OF THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO


Jim Ellard, Director
Emergency Measures Ontario
as authorized by the Ministry of Solicitor
General for the Province of Ontario

SCHEDULES

- A** *NAN First Nations' Concerns and Issues*
- B** *Roles and Responsibilities of Government Departments, Ministries and Agencies*
- C** *List of Member NAN First Nations*
- D** *Reception Communities*
- E** *Distribution List*

SCHEDULE "A"

NAN FIRST NATIONS CONCERNS and ISSUES

1. *Emergency Evacuation Plans in respect to First Nation jurisdiction and authority*
2. *First Nations input on selection of reception site*
3. *First Nations policing and security at evacuation and reception sites*
4. *Social upheaval and cultural impacts on evacuees*
5. *Vehicle and aircraft safety during evacuations*
6. *Communications problems, procedures, systems and jurisdictional boundaries during emergency planning, response, evacuations, operations and aftercare*
7. *Special health needs of the evacuees at host community*
8. *Problems with actual emergency response time*
9. *Surplus groceries/supplies at evacuation centres*
10. *Development of Evacuation Plans at NAN First Nation communities*
11. *Reimbursements resulting from First Nations' evacuations*
12. *DIAND representative at receiving site*
13. *Role of the Tribal Councils to be clarified in evacuations*
14. *National Health and Welfare Canada jurisdiction and representation during evacuations*

SCHEDULE "B"

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF FIRST NATIONS, CANADA AND ONTARIO MINISTRIES

1. NAN FIRST NATIONS

1.1 Chief and Band Council

The Chief and Council of a NAN First Nation is the primary responsibility and authority for emergency preparedness (including planning, testing and training), and evacuation response to forest fire, smoke, or flood emergency and for the welfare of its community residents. The Chief and Council's additional responsibilities will include the following:

- ▶ *Provides communication between MNR District Emergency Response personnel and the Reserve or Settlement population*
- ▶ *Maintains awareness of the emergency situation and takes a lead role during the emergency response period.*
- ▶ *During the response period, the Chief and Council will meet with members of MNR District Emergency Response Team in accordance with emergency plan and direct the evacuation tactical development*
- ▶ *The Chief and Council will take the lead role in community-related matters including declaration of emergencies, alerting residents, selection of reception centres, communications, and dealing with post-evacuation matters.*

2. CANADA

2.1 Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development

Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) will maintain its fiduciary and trust responsibility to NAN First Nations by providing consultation, advice and financial support for emergency assistance supplied by Ontario. In addition, DIAND will provide the following additional responsibilities:

- ▶ *On-site administrative and liaison team support as required.*
- ▶ *Assistance in the coordination of reception, maintenance and rehabilitation of evacuees*
- ▶ *Cost recovery assistance and resourcing to First Nations*

2.2 Emergency Preparedness Canada

The Regional Director of Emergency Preparedness Canada will arrange additional federal emergency assistance to both Ontario and DIAND as requested and will assist with arrangements made by Ontario with other federal departments on behalf of DIAND.

In addition, Emergency Preparedness Canada will have the following responsibilities:

- ▶ *Provision of vacancies at the Canadian Emergency Preparedness College for training of First Nations staff in accordance with arrangements for provincially sponsored candidates.*

2.3 Health Canada

On behalf of Canada's fiduciary responsibility, the Medical Services Branch of Health Canada will provide medical and health related advice to assist Chief and Council in making decisions with respect to the total or partial evacuation of a community, affected by smoke or forest fires. In conjunction with the First Nation, local health providers will develop and implement an action plan for handling smoke inhalation and develop a protocol to prioritize evacuees based on susceptibility to the conditions. Health providers will identify clients requiring special care at the reception centres.

In addition, Medical Services will be responsible for the following:

- ▶ *Providing human resources at the reception centre to ensure the health and safety of First Nations citizens*
- ▶ *Provision of information on special care patients, i.e. numbers and special considerations*
- ▶ *Coordination and support of other medical agencies/facilities such as hospitals, clinics, Red Cross, Ministry of Health and St. John's Ambulance as may be required*

2.4 Canadian Rangers (Five Company James Bay)

The Canadian Rangers (Five Company James Bay) can assist First Nations in which they are located, during times of declared emergencies. Canadian Rangers (Five Company James Bay), as members of the First Nations, can assist in several ways:

- *As receiving/liaison teams in evacuations*
- *As support teams at reception centres*
- *Assist other Canadian Forces assets, i.e. aircraft*
- *Act as security, only within an evacuated community and at reception centres*

The Canadian Rangers (Five Company James Bay), as a sub-component of the Canadian Forces, can work with other units of the Canadian Forces. In utilizing the Canadian Rangers (Five Company James Bay), the First Nations must inform the Canadian Ranger headquarters at CFB Borden, and the Province of Ontario. As a collective, the Ranger Patrol can conduct a variety of tasks not limited to those above, with the exception of law enforcement.

3. ONTARIO

3.1 Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services

Emergency Measures Ontario (EMO), which is part of the Public Safety Division within this Ministry, has been responsible for ensuring that communities in Ontario are prepared for all emergencies assists them in developing and testing their emergency plans.

In the event of a major emergency, EMO will assist the affected community. The Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services (MSGCS) through EMO, is the coordinating authority for Provincial assistance during an emergency. The Ministry should be notified if the threat of an emergency exists and must be notified when an emergency has been declared.

While it will not take over and manage the emergency, EMO can provide liaison, co-ordination and a central point for contact with other Provincial Ministries and the Federal Government, if required.

Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) are also part of the Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services. The OPP has the responsibility of providing for the safety and security of Ontario residents and their property through the provision of law and order.

3.2 Ministry of Natural Resources

The Ministry of Natural Resources maintains a provincial forest fire and flood monitoring system and provides alerts as required, to municipal and unorganized communities, including First Nations.

Under Order-in-Council 1620/95, the Ministry of Natural Resources has responsibility to formulate a provincial emergency plan for forest fire and flood situations. This plan will govern the provision of necessary services during an emergency and the procedures under which the Ministry of Natural Resources will respond to a forest fire or flood emergency.

In areas with no municipal government, the Ministry of Natural Resources is responsible for the development of forest fire and flood emergency response plans designed to meet the needs of forest fire and flood emergency situations in concert with representatives from local communities, including First Nations.

It is recognized that the First Nation Council is the local authority for the purpose of formulating and implementing emergency plans for a First Nation community. It is also recognized that Chiefs of First Nation Councils, or their designates, may declare that an emergency exists at a First Nation community, or in any part thereof, and may take such action as considered necessary to implement their emergency plan to protect the health, safety, welfare and property of the community. If requested, the Ministry of Natural Resources will provide or arrange for additional support for forest fire and flood emergencies declared by the First Nation Chiefs.

3.4 Ministry of Transportation

The Ministry of Transportation (MTO) outlines its responsibilities for remote air, during evacuations or other emergencies at NAN communities which are served by MTO remote airports as follows.

The MTO is responsible for the Remote Northern Transportation Office (Airports). During emergencies requiring the evacuation of residents of the community, the Ministry will:

- Provide facilities at the airport to support the evacuation*
- Maintain the airport facility throughout the emergency response period*
- Provide resources to other Provincial Government Ministries to assist them in dealing with the emergency*

Please note: Where communities are serviced by a Provincial roadway, the MTO will endeavour to maintain the road in a safe and useable condition. This will allow for the safe transportation of emergency response personnel as well as unhindered evacuation of residents to a safe area.

4. OTHER AGENCIES

4.1 Nishnawbe-Aski Police Services

In the event of an emergency, the Nishnawbe-Aski Police Service (hereinafter referred to as "NAPS") will work in concert with the affected community to provide assistance however required.

NAPS has the responsibility of providing for the safety and security of the NAN First Nations residents and their property through the provisions of law and order.

In the event of an emergency, NAPS is responsible for:

- *the protection of life and property and the provision of law and order;*
- *the investigation of occurrences related to the emergency;*
- *liaison with other community, provincial and federal police agencies as required (such as OPP, Timmins Police, etc);*
- *where permitted by protocols, NAPS officers will provide policing services at evacuee centres and other facilities;*
- *in the areas of jurisdictions where other police agencies are responsible, NAPS officers through protocols will assist in policing services, translation and other duties as assigned;*
- *liaison with local officials (e.g. First Nation Chiefs, emergency co-ordinators, etc.);*
- *alerting persons endangered by the emergency and assisting in evacuation;*
- *providing traffic control to facilitate the movement of emergency vehicles and residents;*
- *notification of necessary emergency and community services as required;*
- *establishing a communications link with senior NAPS personnel; and,*
- *other duties as assigned by the Chief of Police or designate.*

SCHEDULE "C"

LIST OF MEMBER NAN FIRST NATIONS

| | |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| <i>Flying Post First Nation</i> | <i>Webequie First Nation</i> |
| <i>Mishkeegogamang First Nation</i> | <i>Whitewater Lake First Nation</i> |
| <i>Mocreebec Indian Government</i> | <i>Attawapiskat First Nation</i> |
| <i>Sandy Lake First Nation</i> | <i>Chapleau Cree First Nation</i> |
| <i>Weenusk First Nation</i> | <i>Fort Albany First Nation</i> |
| <i>Big Trout Lake First Nation</i> | <i>Kashechewan First Nation</i> |
| <i>Muskrat Dam First Nation</i> | <i>Missanabie Cree First Nation</i> |
| <i>Pikangikum First Nation</i> | <i>Moose Cree First Nation</i> |
| <i>Lac Seul First Nation</i> | <i>New Post First Nation</i> |
| <i>Deer Lake First Nation</i> | <i>Kingfisher Lake First Nation</i> |
| <i>Fort Severn First Nation</i> | <i>Wapekeka First Nation</i> |
| <i>Kasabonika Lake First Nation</i> | <i>Wawakapewin First Nation</i> |
| <i>Kee-Way-Win First Nation</i> | <i>Wunnumin Lake First Nation</i> |
| <i>MacDowell Lake First Nation</i> | <i>Beaverhouse First Nation</i> |
| <i>North Spirit Lake First Nation</i> | <i>Brunswick House First Nation</i> |
| <i>Poplar Hill First Nation</i> | <i>Chapleau Ojibway First Nation</i> |
| <i>Aroland First Nation</i> | <i>Matachewan First Nation</i> |
| <i>Constance Lake First Nation</i> | <i>Mattagami First Nation</i> |
| <i>Eabametoong First Nation</i> | <i>Wahgoshig First Nation</i> |
| <i>Ginoogaming First Nation</i> | <i>Bearskin Lake First Nation</i> |
| <i>Hornepayne First Nation</i> | <i>Cat Lake First Nation</i> |
| <i>Lansdowne House First Nation</i> | <i>Koocheching First Nation</i> |
| <i>Long Lake #58 First Nation</i> | <i>North Caribou Lake First Nation</i> |
| <i>Marten Falls First Nation</i> | <i>Sachigo Lake First Nation</i> |
| <i>Nibinamik First Nation</i> | <i>Slate Falls First Nation</i> |

SCHEDULE "D"

RECEPTION COMMUNITIES

| Community Name | Approximate No. of Evacuees | General Services |
|------------------------------|--|---|
| <hr/> | | |
| <i>Cochrane</i> | <i>150</i> | <i>food, shelter, medical pending commercial accommodation availability</i> |
| <i>Ear Falls</i> | <i>150</i> | <i>food, shelter, limited medical</i> |
| <i>Township of Golden</i> | <i>200</i> | <i>food, shelter, limited medical</i> |
| <i>Geraldton</i> | <i>400 - 1500 pending resource availability</i> | <i>all services</i> |
| <i>Marathon</i> | <i>200</i> | <i>all services</i> |
| <i>Moosonee</i> | <i>450</i> | <i>all services</i> |
| <i>New Post First Nation</i> | <i>50</i> | <i>food, shelter</i> |
| <i>Red Lake</i> | <i>150 - 400</i> | <i>food, shelter, medical</i> |
| <i>Sioux Lookout</i> | <i>300 - 600</i> | <i>all services</i> |
| <i>Thunder Bay</i> | <i>3000 - 7000</i> | <i>all services</i> |
| <i>Timmins</i> | <i>650 initial pending resources - up to 2000.</i> | <i>all services</i> |
| <i>Sault Ste. Marie</i> | <i>500 initial maximum pending resources.</i> | <i>all services</i> |

SCHEDULE "E"

DISTRIBUTION LIST

- *All NAN First Nations (as per Schedule "C")*
- *Reception Communities (as per Schedule "D")*
- *NAN Tribal Councils*
 - *Independent First Nation Alliance*
 - *Matawa First Nations*
 - *Shibogama First Nations Council*
 - *Windigo First Nation Council*
 - *Keewaytinook Okimakanak*
 - *Mushkegowuk Council*
 - *Wabun Tribal Council*
- *Saugeen First Nation*

ONTARIO

- *Ministry of Natural Resources*
 - *Eastern and Western Fire Region Program Managers (NAN area)*
 - *MNR District Managers (NAN area):*
 - *Red Lake, Nipigon, Cochrane, Timmins, Hearst, Sioux Lookout, Chapleau, Kirkland Lake*
- *Ministry of Transportation*
- *Ministry of the Environment and Energy*
- *Ministry of Health*
- *Ministry of Community & Social Services*
- *Ministry of the Solicitor General*
 - *Emergency Measures Ontario*
 - *Ontario Provincial Police*

CANADA

- *Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development*
 - *Western, Sioux Lookout and Sudbury Districts*
- *Emergency Preparedness Canada*
- *Health & Welfare Canada*
- *Department of National Defence*

OTHER AGENCIES

- *Nishnawbe-Aski Police Services*
- *Canadian Rangers (Five Company James Bay)*



Nishnawbe Aski Nation
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(807) 623-8228
[FAX] (807) 623-7730



nan.ca



100 Back Street, Unit 200
Thunder Bay, ON P7J 1L2



Appendix B



Nishnawbe Aski Nation
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NAN Natural Disaster Data Base - June 2020.

| Community | Date | Hazard | Evacuation | Details |
|---------------|------------|-----------------------------|------------|---|
| Attawapiskat | 2009-07-11 | Loss of Essential Services | No | On July 11, 2009 INAC Funding Services was notified that there was a sewage spill at a lift station in the community. INAC officials did an onsite inspection on July 14 and determined that the spill was been contained. The FN is pumping the sewage via truck to their sewage lagoon until the lift station can be repaired. No sewage was spilled into the environment surrounding the lift station. No risk to drinking water or the environment was identified. On July 22, 2009, Health Canada assessed the situation and recommended that the residents of the 8 homes be removed immediately until clean up can be completed. The First Nation's evacuation plan was discussed at a teleconference with the First Nation, EMO, and INAC. The community has declared a second State of Emergency due to the eight homes with sewage backup and was adamant that 71 individuals (based on new head count) be evacuated outside the community with a time frame of six to eight weeks, until the homes could be cleaned and liveable. On July 23, 2009, INAC Ontario Region officials and the Chief and Council met in the community to discuss their options. As a result, affected homes were visited by INAC officials and an evacuation outside the community was deemed unnecessary at this time. |
| Attawapiskat | 2011-01-22 | Loss of Essential Services | No | On January 22, 2011, the ON Regional Office reported that various communities in the James Bay area experienced a power outage at approximately 03h00. Later that day, Hydro-One reported that the power had been restored to the majority of the area at approximately 10h30, however, some communities had not regained power until approximately 13h00. The town of Moosonee had declared an emergency due to their water treatment plant failing to re-start once the power was restored and as a result, the municipality issued a boil water advisory. |
| Attawapiskat | 2018-05-10 | Flooding | No | * AT RISK OF FLOODING - 10MAY2018: Ice break on Attawapiskat River. Minor ice-jam two km from the community and a much larger one (30km in length) further upstream. 12MAY2018: Currently no flooding, but water levels are moderate to high. 14MAY2018: Large ice jam in evidence at the west side of Attawapiskat causing no concerns presently. 15MAY2018: Attawapiskat River continues to be monitored. 17MAY2018: Some ice remains, no longer concerns or call for evacuation. This will be the final notification unless significant changes occur. |
| Bearskin Lake | 2011-07-19 | Wildland Fire | No | On July 19, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that the community declared an emergency. In addition, they have requested that 50 phase 1 residents be evacuated. As of July 21, 2011, smoke conditions had improved. |
| Bearskin Lake | 2012-12-14 | Loss of Essential Services | No | On December 13, 2012, the AANDC ON Regional Office and Emergency Management Ontario received a Declaration of Emergency from the Chief and Council. The Declaration stated that, due to financial constraints, the community is unable to maintain sufficient levels of fuel (diesel and gasoline) to provide essential services to their community. Currently all fuel must be flown in quantities that only last a few days. This is causing costs to escalate to a level that the community is unable to manage. The community normally has sufficient fuel stored for the winter season. However, this year it was unable to acquire sufficient fuel because the winter road ended prematurely in March 2012. On December 17, 2013, the AANDC ON regional office reported that an emergency cheque was provided to the First Nation and that fuel deliveries are being made. |
| Cat Lake | 2009-09-18 | Environmental Contamination | No | On September 15, 2009, a Health Canada official notified the Ontario Regional office about a non-operational lift station in the community. On September 14, 2009, Northern Water Works Inc. (NWI) unblocked the lift station in proximity to the nursing station. On September 16, 2009, the lift station was reportedly causing a sewage spill near the nursing station. The problem was likely due to gravel falling through the manholes which at times had their covers temporarily displaced by the grader. On September 17, 2009, NWI were again in the community to test and repair the pumps and lift stations. Health Canada officials have indicated to the First Nation they may need to remove nursing services from the community until this situation is rectified. INAC officials have reported that the repairs conducted by NWI on September 17, 2009, were completed and the system is functioning. There are no negative impacts on the environment or health and safety of community members. |

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| Cat Lake | 2016-09-17 | Loss of Essential Services | No | On 17SEP2016, provincial authorities were informed of a telecommunications disruption in the community due to a fire destroying the Bell building that housed the telecommunications equipment. Approximately 610 residents are without communication and police are using SAT phones to communicate. There is a possibility of an Emergency Restoration Trailer deployment as a temporary solution. However, Bell is reaching out for assistance in getting the trailer to the First Nation. A request to assist in transporting the trailer was made to Public Safety, but was denied on the basis that this situation does not pose a threat to life and limb. There is no estimated date for the full rebuild of the location because of the remote region. Due to the burnt network, the cellular on wheels might not be an option. |
| Cat Lake | 2018-07-20 | Wildland Fire | No | AT RISK OF WILDLAND FIRE - 20JUL2018: Smoke conditions have improved. Evacuation lists have been created should it be necessary to evacuate. |
| Constance Lake | 2010-07-28 | Loss of Essential Services | No | On July 28, 2010, the Ontario Region reported that the community's water treatment plant is unable to produce sufficient water to meet community demand due to a blue green algae bloom in Constance Lake which appears to be clogging the plant's filters. Currently, the water supply must be periodically shut off in order to build up sufficient supply to operate the plant properly. Residents are being provided with bottled water and hand sanitizers. A temporary site has been set up for filling containers to replenish toilets as necessary. Water trucks are being used to fill the water treatment plant reservoir from an alternate source. According to media reports, a state of emergency has been declared, however the regional office has not received it. The regional office is working with the First Nation, the Matawa Tribal Council and the Ontario Clean Water Agency to restore the water supply. As of July 30, water tankers continue to provide water to the water treatment plant reservoir on a regular basis. Well drilling will commence on August 3, 2010, to assess additional water sources. It is now expected that the algae bloom should dissipate at the end of August or early September as it is deemed to be a seasonal occurrence. |
| Constance Lake | 2013-05-03 | Flooding | No | Due to rapid snow melt and recent heavy rain, on 3MAY2013, the First Nation declared a State of Local Emergency. Water has overwhelmed the First Nation's pumping system and lift station, as well as causing overflow of manholes and drainage systems. There have been reports of flooding of basements causing extensive damage to homes. The community's drinking water may also have been compromised and bottled water may be required. |
| Constance Lake | 2014-06-09 | Flooding | No | A Declaration of Emergency issued on 9JUN2014 due to overland flooding; basements are flooded and manholes and drainage systems are overflowing; As of 16JUN2014, six homes experienced sewage backup and the sewage was pumped into the ditches. In recovery phase; damaged homes have been cleaned up as of 25JUL2014. |
| Deer Lake | 2018-05-24 | Wildland Fire | No | CONCERN OF WILDLAND FIRE - 24MAY2018: MB fire crossed provincial border. Provincial authorities and First Nations monitoring. 28MAY2018: Rain expected in area. 31MAY2018: This will be the final notification unless significant changes occur. |
| Eabamtoong First Nation | 2010-05-05 | Loss of Essential Services | No | On May 5, 2010, the water treatment plant operator in the community called to report that sewage lift station number 3 had malfunctioned affecting a housing subdivision serving approximately 2/3 of the community. On May 6, 2010, in order to assess the situation, and reduce the flows of sewage through the lift station, water to the entire community was turned off. On May 7, 2010, the community declared a State of Emergency (a BCR has been provided to INAC). INAC has extended the bottled water service and has provided sixty Porta Potties to the First Nation (1 for every 5 houses). On May 11, 2010, the water service was restored; however, a Boil Water Advisory remains in effect until full testing can be completed. Efforts to restore services to parts of the community also failed as isolation valves in the distribution system are not functioning. On May 12, 2010, the plumbing mechanics reported that the lift station valve had shifted due to frost heave and is more than likely the primary cause of the problems with the sewage system. It is expected that the valve repair will be completed by May 14, 2010. |

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| Eabamtoong First Nation | 2010-06-19 | Loss of Essential Services | No | On June 19, 2010, the First Nation band manager advised that they had discovered that the water treatment plant had been broken into and vandalized. The community was concerned that the equipment may have sustained damage. It was decided to drain the tanks and re-pressurize the system. The community had taken the liberty of ordering water on June 19, 2010. On June 20, 2010, the INAC Ontario Regional Office indicated that the community had declared a state of emergency due to lack of potable water in the community. A boil advisory was already in effect in this community before the incidents over the weekend and remains in place. As of June 21, 2010, the issue had been resolved. |
| Eabamtoong First Nation | 2017-06-06 | Loss of Essential Services | No | SOLE - On 6JUN2017, a structural fire damaged a portion of the First Nation's water intake structure. Power to the wet well was switched off, meaning the First Nation can no longer draw water from the lake. As a result, the community does not have potable water or water in the fire hydrants, and declared a State of Local Emergency. Pumps, hoses, and a pumper truck are available and an electrician and mechanic are on site. A contractor has been hired to assess damages and propose solutions in the interim. INAC is providing bottled water for consumption and personal hygiene. There is currently no estimated timeline for the reopening of the plant. Updates will be provided as information becomes available. As of 15JUN2017, the State of Local Emergency has been terminated. As of 15JUN2017, the Do Not Consume Water Advisory has been rescinded and the Boil Water Advisory has been reissued by Health Health Canada. |
| Fort Albany | 2011-01-22 | Loss of Essential Services | No | On January 22, 2011, the ON Regional Office reported that the community experienced a power outage at approximately 03h00. Later that day, Hydro-One reported that the power had been restored to the majority of the area at approximately 10h30, however, some communities had not regained power until approximately 13h00. The town of Moosonee had declared an emergency due to their water treatment plant failing to re-start once the power was restored and as a result, the municipality issued a boil water advisory. |
| Fort Albany | 2012-03-24 | Flooding | No | On March 24, 2012, the EMO was advised that high water levels and ice break up was observed during a surveillance flight of the Albany River near Hat Island. Flow rates had risen significantly. MNR confirmed that the river gauges indicated ice had likely broken up at Hat Island, however, it would be 2-3 days before these conditions would reach the community. The water levels are very high and there is a very high potential for flooding at the communities of Fort Albany and Kashechewan. MNR will attempt to arrange for an overflight of the Albany River on March 24, 2012, the Kashechewan community indicated that they would be able to provide the aircraft fuel required. evacuations currently being planned. As of March 25, 2012, Fort Albany First Nation and Kashechewan First Nation are preparing to evacuate additional Priority 1 members. EMO has five planes available for evacuations with a capacity of 130 passenger seats. The current weather will likely delay these flights until this afternoon. On March 25, 2012, MNR reported that ice break up or accumulated ice is now located adjacent to the communities of Fort Albany and Kashechewan. Water levels are dropping but remain high at the jam. However, the river behind the ice jam continues to flow at a high velocity. The ice accumulation is approximately 10 km in length and scattered debris are continuing to flow from up river and adding to the existing ice jam. The Stooeping River, a major tributary to the Albany River near Fort Albany, remains solid and has not yet broken up. When the breakup of ice from Stooeping River occurs this may also add to the existing ice jam and may cause water levels to increase. However the water level increase could also allow for the present ice jam to break apart or continue to advance downstream to James Bay. The main concern is the potential for the ice jam at the communities to cause flooding issues as a result of backing up of water. Subsequently, the forecasted cooler temperatures over the next few days and nights may result in the ice jam at the communities to remain stationary for several days which may lead to back up of water and further flooding issues. The MNR is planning another flight over the Kashechewan and Fort Albany areas in the afternoon of March 26, 2012. As of |
| Fort Albany | 2013-05-07 | Flooding | No | State of local Emergency declared from 2MAY2013 to 7MAY2013 due to unsafe drinking water and sewage lagoon overflow. Joint Task Force Central Canadian Rangers personnel and equipment are providing assistance with moving essential supplies, conducting river observations and delivering water. On 12MAY2013, the community is experiencing localized flooding. The causeway connecting the community with the airport and store has been flooded. As of 13MAY2013, Albany River remains stable. |

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| Fort Albany | 2018-05-07 | Flooding | No | AT RISK OF FLOODING - Daily calls taking place with all stakeholders - 7MAY2018: Community is under flood watch, with no intent to evacuate at this time. 9MAY2018: Causeway is still flooded, but water is receding. Flood warning downgraded to flood watch. 17MAY2018: Moose and Albany rivers are no longer a threat. This will be the final notification unless significant changes occur. |
| Fort Severn | 2013-01-29 | Loss of Essential Services | No | On January 29, 2013, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported a water main break had occurred in the community, resulting in the decision to close the local school. AANDC ON Regional Office reports that reservoirs are filling adequately, and that any watermain leaks have been repaired. The four homes without water still have frozen lines, but residents are being otherwise accommodated within the community. School classes have resumed as of February 1, 2013, with water supply restored to all buildings except for one administration building. With the recent completion of the winter road, AANDC ON Regional Office expects fuel delivery by road to resume next week. Once this occurs, fuel will no longer be flown in. Until then, fuel deliveries are expected on February 7 and 8, 2013. |
| Fort Severn | 2018-08-01 | Wildland Fire | No | AT RISK OF WILDLAND FIRE - 1AUG2018: 9 new fires were discovered near the community. Provincial authorities flew over the community to assess risk, crews will be there today. There is currently no immediate threat to the community; the fires are approximately 40 KM away. 4AUG2018: Smoke may affect the First Nation, due to 9 active fires to the south and west of the community. 8AUG2018: Crews are responding to 5 fires in proximity of the community. An additional 5 fires further from the community are being observed. 10AUG2018: Immediate threat has passed. This will be the final notification unless significant changes occur. |
| Fort William | 2012-05-28 | Flooding | No | On May 28, 2012, the AANDC ON Thunder Bay Office reported that, due to torrential rains, the Fort William First Nation had experienced flooding and critical infrastructure failures. The First Nation's sewage treatment plant (septic field and lagoons) were flooded. As a result, the First Nations administration buildings were closed until the septic issues were remediated. Additionally, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that the City of Thunder Bay had declared a state of emergency and issued a water advisory. They asked all citizens to avoid showers, baths, and flushing or releasing any water down the drains. The potable water for the Fort William First Nation is provided by the municipal distribution of Thunder Bay, and as such, are under the same water advisory. The flood had caused some roads to be washed out; however, community road access is still available. Hydro and water availability had been affected to some community members. The First Nations' rural schools and busing had also been affected on May 28, 2012. On May 29, 2012, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that the First Nation's Public Works Department had completed all repairs. All community buildings have access to water and sewer and have been reopened. |
| Ginoogaming First Nation | 2014-02-27 | Loss of Essential Services | No | On 27FEB2014 the natural gas system running through the municipality of greenstone malfunctioned, leaving the community with no natural gas supply. Union Gas sent repair crews to the community yesterday and the issue that caused the malfunction was resolved. Natural gas service has been restored with the exception of a couple of homes in Ginoogaming (where no one was home). 55 homes were affected. Information was received by the regional office. |
| Kashechewan | 2011-01-22 | Loss of Essential Services | No | On January 22, 2011, the ON Regional Office reported that various communities in the James Bay area experienced a power outage at approximately 03h00. Later that day, Hydro-One reported that the power had been restored to the majority of the area at approximately 10h30, however, some communities had not regained power until approximately 13h00. The town of Moosonee had declared an emergency due to their water treatment plant failing to re-start once the power was restored and as a result, the municipality issued a boil water advisory. |

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| Kashechewan | 2012-11-23 | Loss of Essential Services | No | On November 23, 2012, Emergency Management Ontario reported that the community had declared a state of local emergency due to a shortage of fuel and lack of heat to 21 homes in the community. Earlier this year, 21 housing units were flooded causing damage to the electric furnaces. Temporary repairs were made; however, repairs have since broken down and families are without consistent heat. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that there was a fuel shortage in the community. On November 28, 2012, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that the Department provided \$24,397 to cover the incremental cost of fuel delivery by air for urgent health and safety needs. The Department has also released an emergency cheque in the amount of \$700,000 for the purchase of building supplies, the renovation of 21 housing units, as well as additional funding to provide further air delivery of fuel. |
| Kee-Way-Win | 2016-10-22 | Loss of Essential Services | No | On 22OCT2016, two of the community's generators went out. The water treatment and sewage plants have their own backup generators and remain operational. The nursing station emergency generator is operational, but requires constant fuel refilling. Power was restored to the community as of 27OCT2016. Assessments on upgrade options for a temporary generator, required repairs, and future capacity upgrades will take place on 3NOV2016 pending favourable weather conditions. Cell service is down and will continue to be down until power is restored, however, land lines are operational at this time. Community personnel are keeping the Water Treatment Plant and the Nurses station generators fueled. As of 6NOV2016, the community is trying to acquire a new engine for the 545 KW unit and other temporary equipment. Air transport is a problem due to the weight of the unit. |
| Kee-Way-Win | 2019-07-01 | Wildland Fire | No | 01JUL2019: RED 23 is 34,000 ha in size and is located approximately 12-15 km from the community, between North Spirit Lake and Kee-way-win. The fire is out of control and has caused smoke to affect both communities. Smoke from the Manitoba fires also remains a concern. Kee-Way-Win FN declares State of Local Emergency (SOLE) due to the smoke and close proximity of the fire. The community has requested the evacuation of the most vulnerable (approximately 170 people); host communities and flights are planned. 02JUL2019: Red Lake Fire Number 23 is 12 km southwest of the community and grew to 54,000 ha on 01JUL2019 under extreme burning conditions. The fire currently burns in a west to east line. There are a number of fires in the area as well as fires in Manitoba that contribute to smoke; flight condition will depend on wind direction going forward. The Town of Sioux Lookout has agreed to become a host community and transportation hub; approximately 62 people will be evacuated on 02JUL2019. Additional 9 flights are planned for 03JUL2019 to transport approximately 225 people. One medical evacuation took place on 01JUL2019 night for an elder who required institutional care. Population of Kee-Way-Win: approximately 477 (409 on-reserve). 03JUL2019: The Fire RED23 grew to 55,000 ha on 02JUL2019 under extreme burning conditions. There is currently no internet or cell service in the community. 87 people were evacuated to Sioux Lookout on 02JUL2019 and the remaining 133 vulnerable community members will be evacuated on 03JUL2019. Full scale evacuation will be determined based on smoke/fire conditions. 04JUL2019: Fire RED 23 is 54,643 ha in size. An evacuation order is in effect for the community; full scale evacuation is requested by FN. Approximately 220 vulnerable community members were evacuated to Sioux Lookout. The remaining community members will be evacuated on 04JUL2019 to Timmins and a small team will remain in the community to attend to the critical infrastructure. 05JUL2019: Fire RED 23 is 60,000 ha in size and remains 10 km from the community; extreme fire behavior is expected over the next several days. Four flights arrived in Timmins on 04JUL2019; this concludes |

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| Kingfisher | 2017-07-18 | Loss of Essential Services | No | Loss of Potable Water - On 18JUL2017, the community declared a State of Local Emergency due to a severed return line in the community's drinking water system that left the community without safe drinking water. The water line was accidentally severed during a construction project to build some new houses in Kingfisher Lake. Resultant flooding from the lift station damaged the community's only store. Shibogama Tribal Council made immediate arrangements for bottled water; on 19JUL2017, the tribal council also arranged for grocery items (perishables and baby items) to be flown in as the community's only store remains closed for flood clean up. On 19JUL2017 repairs to the water line were completed, the water turned on, and the lines flushed. Water testing is ongoing. Bottled water will be required until the lab results are completed. On 20JUL2017 Health Canada's environmental health officer traveled to the community and reported that the secondary store location is being set up while the store is being cleaned. Food and water for the most vulnerable community members is being flown in until the store can be reopened. Due to construction at the airport, all flights must land by 6 PM. |
| Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuug | 2011-07-19 | Wildland Fire | No | On July 19, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that the First Nation declared a state of emergency. In addition, they have no power and will be working with the nurse's station on developing phase 1 lists. No further developments. |
| Lac Seul | 2018-08-01 | Wildland Fire | No | AT RISK OF WILDLAND FIRE - 1AUG2018: Community is being monitored. Smoke conditions are a concern. Documents are being prepared for vulnerable population. |
| Long Lake | 2014-02-27 | Loss of Essential Services | No | On 27FEB2014 the natural gas system running through the municipality of greenstone malfunctioned, leaving the community with no natural gas supply. Union Gas sent repair crews to the community yesterday and the issue that caused the malfunction was resolved. Natural gas service has been restored with the exception of Long Lake's school (where regulator issues were present). 120 homes were affected. Information was received by the regional office. |
| Mattagami | 2015-03-07 | Environmental Contamination | No | On 07MAR2015 a CN train carrying crude oil derailed and caught fire near Gogoma in northern ON, approximately 25 km from the First Nations community of Mattagami. Initially community members experienced minor respiratory issues due to smoke, however, both CN and EMO assessed the plume as non-toxic. The province will continue to take air samples and to confirm the results. In addition, Provincial officials collected water samples near sensitive fish spawning areas and will also monitor well and ground water with CN. The First Nation's water tables were not affected. |
| Mattagami | 2015-12-14 | Loss of Essential Services | No | On 13DEC2015 an ice storm caused a power outage and telecommunications outage in most of the community. Cell service and most land lines were non-operational, and there was no heat in community buildings and most homes. A State of Local Emergency was declared on 13DEC2015, but could not be transmitted to the department until 16DEC2015 due to telecommunications issues. The community received assistance in the form of fuel for generators and food for vulnerable individuals, as well as help with cutting wood for stoves and clearing road debris. As of 18DEC2015, power was restored to the community. A Hydro One crew has been on site to remove trees and branches that are a potential threat to power lines. Information was received from the regional office. |
| Mattagami | 2018-07-22 | Wildland Fire | No | AT RISK OF WILDLAND FIRE - 22JUL2018: Monitoring the fire/ smoke conditions. |
| Mattagami | 2018-09-21 | Loss of Essential Services | No | ON – Mattagami First Nation – Loss of Essential Services - Power Outage – Pop. 189 21SEPT2018: Power outage occurred in community due to severe weather event. 23SEPT2018: State of local emergency issued by community. Community is concerned for most vulnerable populations. Food and fuel brought to community by the Chief and the Emergency Coordinator. Power, cell service, and 911 restored. Public Works department documenting any damages to buildings and residences. 25SEPT2018: Another power outage occurs but is restored shortly thereafter. This will be the final notification unless significant developments occur. |

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| Mattagami | 2019-04-30 | Flooding | No | Mattagami First Nation (226) – LIMITED ROAD ACCESS DUE TO WASHOUT - 30APR2019: The one road in/out of the community is washed out from underground water. Access is limited (no heavy vehicles) and signage is erected. Situation assessment and temporary repairs are conducted. 17MAY2019: Repairs are expected to start on 27MAY2019. This is the final notification unless significant developments occur. |
| Muskrat Dam | 2011-07-18 | Wildland Fire | No | On July 18, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that this community reported that they did not have power and that there were fires nearby. On July 20, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that the First Nation declared a state of emergency and had prepared a list of 120 phase 1 residents. As of July 22, 2011, smoke conditions were improving. |
| Naicatchewenin | 2014-06-24 | Flooding | No | State of Local Emergency Declared; one road is covered by one foot of water and the Ceremonial Grounds are under water; work has begun on road access to one home; trees that fell in the lake have been removed. As of 2JUL2014 the situation is stable. As of 4JUL2014, repairs were underway to the road. |
| Neskantaga First Nation | 2013-04-28 | Flooding | No | First Nation is impacted by flooding due to melting snow. One lift station is not operational and raw sewage is running into the lake. The main distribution may have to be shut down on April 30, 2013. Pumps and equipment are being deployed to the First Nation, a crew has been hired to assist the people living in the basements of affected homes. The First Nation's bulldozer and excavator are currently inoperable, they are sourcing a mechanic. The backhoe is operational. On 7MAY2013, Matawa arranged for the shipment of 10 utility pumps, hose kits and bottled water for the community. Arrangements have been made for funding, a commitment letter to fund the Emergency Coordinator was sent to the community. On 16MAY2013, the flood risk had ended. The state of local emergency declared on 27APR2013 remains for community suicide crisis. |
| Neskantaga First Nation | 2014-04-04 | Loss of Essential Services | No | On 4APR2014, the First Nation declared a State of Local Emergency due to a fuel spill at the hotel, a blocked sewer line, a broken water line, a leak in the water treatment plant, and the fact that the water treatment plan will need to be shut down for repairs. One family which was living in the hotel had to be relocated. Two homes were damaged by sewage backup. Emergency Management Ontario is currently working with a number of federal/provincial partners in order to address the issues. This First Nation also declared a State of Local Emergency earlier this year due to health/social issues. |
| Neskantaga First Nation | 2019-02-28 | Loss of Essential Services | No | Neskantaga First Nation (239) – ON – Loss of Essential Services (Water Supply) - 28FEB2019: Community's water main is broken which puts the community at risk of fire. Possible requests from the province to assist with evacuations of roughly 250 people. Bottled water and 150 fire extinguishers are sent to the community. The Neskantaga First Nation is located approximately 245km northwest of Nakina with an on-reserve population of approximately 348. 01MAR2019: Water is restored to the community. This is the final notification unless significant developments occur. |
| Nibinamik First Nation | 2012-04-13 | Loss of Essential Services | No | On April 13, 2012, the ON Regional Office reported that the community advised that they suspect their water treatment plant reservoir contains diesel fuel from a leak in the back-up generator room. Northern Waterworks Inc. has been approved by AANDC to conduct an emergency response due to the situation. They will also be coordinating the purchase of the required materials to resolve the situation. Health Canada officials were in the community to conduct water tests for the presence of diesel fuel. On April 26, 2012, Health Canada confirmed the presence of fuel in the water treatment plant reservoir. Health Canada's report indicates that no fuel was found in the community's water distribution system. AANDC ON Regional Office reported that as of May 1, 2012, the First Nation is on a Do Not Use Your Tap Water advisory based on Health Canada's recommendation. Residents continue to receive 2L of bottled water per person per day for drinking purposes. On May 25, 2012, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that the results of the water quality tests from Health Canada came back satisfactory. As a result the community's Do Not Consume advisory has now been changed to a Boil Water advisory. |

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| Nibinamik First Nation | 2017-08-08 | Loss of Essential Services | No | OSS OF POWER On 8AUG2017, an accident involving a front loader and the downing of a hydro pole resulted in a full scale power outage. Damage was assessed and it may take up to five days to restore power. Replacement transformers are expected to arrive on 11AUG2017. The Matawa Tribal Council is assisting the community by providing generators (including for the sewage pumping station), drinking water and supplies required to conduct repairs. The community nursing station is operational. On 11AUG2017, members discovered that the crash has created an oil spill and an Environmental Health Officer from Health Canada will travel to the community to assess the situation. The community is currently under a youth suicide crisis, and there are a number of mental health workers in the community. A forest fire is currently burning approximately 11 km north of the community and provincial officials are assessing and developing a plan of action to protect structures. There are approximately 320 people in the community with 100 to 150 people returning over the weekend. The First Nation is making contingency plans should the airport close or should an evacuation be required. INAC's Community Infrastructure Directorate is working with the First Nation and the Matawa Tribal Council to develop a minor capital application to recover the costs. As of 14AUG2017, power has been restored to the community. As of 18AUG2017, the Ministry of Children and Youth Services has reached out to a number of third party organizations to ensure that at risk community members have the immediate support the need. As of 21AUG2017, the power system, water treatment plant, and the sewage lift stations are operational. The boil water advisory remains in effect. Health Canada will return to the community on 23AUG2017 to test the water. |
| Nibinamik First Nation | 2018-07-20 | Wildland Fire | No | AT RISK OF WILDLAND FIRE - 20JUL2018: Smoke conditions have improved. Evacuation lists have been created should it be necessary to evacuate. |
| Nibinamik First Nation | 2020-05-15 | Loss of Essential Services | No | 15MAY2020: FN declared State of Emergency due to Covid-19 and issues with Diesel Generating System on 13MAY2020. FN reports frequent power outages. Water sanitation systems require power to operate. Risk sewage backups. Further updates to follow. |
| Nigigoonsiminikaaning First Nation | 2014-06-21 | Flooding | No | State of Local Emergency Declared. The beach and low laying areas are affected by flooding. As of 30JUN2014 sandbagging efforts were completed and all areas and wall are being reinforced and assessed. The community's main access road was damaged and repaired by the Province. |
| North Caribou Lake | 2019-02-17 | Environmental Contamination | No | North Caribou Lake (204) – ON – Environmental Contamination (Sewage & Fuel Spill) – State of Local Emergency (SOLE) - 17FEB2019: Due to sewage lagoon's overflow and effluent leak, SOLE is declared. Health concerns are cited over the odor and risks around the winter road network as the lagoon constitutes part of it. No evacuation required. The North Caribou Lake First Nation is located approximately 325 km north of Sioux Lookout, south of north Caribou Lake with an on-reserve population of approximately 864. 18FEB2019: The effluent continues to leak and a fuel spill (2000L) is identified at approximately 20KM down the winter road past the sewage lagoon. Spills action center notified and appropriate clean-up efforts underway. Assessment of the situation is conducted by relevant parties (sample of water for potential contaminants, infrastructure and health issues). 20FEB2019: Temporary steel plate is placed over the roadway to avoid vehicles from getting stuck or contaminated from the raw sewage. Community looks into alternate route for winter road passage. Water sampling of raw and treated water are deemed good at this time. 22FEB2019: 2 leaks are found in the waste lagoon. Overflow appears to slow down, but the waste water reaches the small creek that flows into Weagamow Lake, community's clean water source. Water treatment plant continues to function well and treated water continues to test well. This is the final notification unless significant developments occur. |

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| North Spirit Lake | 2011-05-13 | Environmental Contamination | No | On May 18, 2011, the INAC ON Regional Office reported that a fire occurred at the North Spirit Lake First Nation's Diesel Generator Station (DGS) during the first week of May, 2011. Unit B caught fire and was a total loss. As a result, of Unit B's fire, it also damaged Unit A. However, Unit C remained operational which allowed for sporadic power supply. As of May 17, 2011, electrical power had been restored to the community. On May 12, 2011, the school was closed as a result of the sporadic power outages. Also due to the sporadic power outages, the water treatment plant was working on stand-by power. During the outages the waste water system was manually pumped out and delivered to a pit. On May 13, 2011, the DGS experienced a diesel spill of approximately 1,000 litres. During the winter two new 50,000 litres tanks were filled over their nominal capacity, and due to warm weather conditions, the fuel in the tanks expanded and overflowed through the vent pipe. The INAC ON Regional Office Environment Unit is working with the First Nation to conduct further clean-up measures. |
| North Spirit Lake | 2018-05-24 | Wildland Fire | No | CONCERN OF WILDLAND FIRE - 24MAY2018: MB fire crossed provincial border. Provincial authorities and First Nations monitoring. 28MAY2018: Rain expected in area. 31MAY2018: This will be the final notification unless significant changes occur. |
| North Spirit Lake | 2019-07-01 | Wildland Fire | No | North Spirit Lake (238) – IMPACTED BY SMOKE - 01JUL2019: Due to the smoke and the close proximity of the fire RED 23, North Spirit Lake FN prepares in the event of an evacuation. Population of North Spirit Lake: approximately 428 / 05JUL2019: The community has an evacuation plan in place if required. 09JUL2019: The North Spirit Lake FN located south of Kee-Way-Win, is to declare a State of Emergency due to severe smoke impacting the community. North Spirit Lake FN is a fly-in community. 11JUL2019: Smoke from RED23 is expected to drift towards North Spirit Lake FN and away from Kee-Way-Win FN. 12JUL2019: RED23 is 14 km to North Spirit Lake FN and there was some fire growth towards the south. 17JUL2019: Smoke from wildland fire is no longer a threat to FN. This is the final notification unless significant developments occur. |
| Pikangikum | 2011-11-28 | Loss of Essential Services | No | On November 28, 2011, the ON Regional Office reported that the First Nation had declared a state of emergency due problems within their water distribution systems. The issue had been caused by a break in the water main at an unknown location along the line. There had been no supply of potable water or running water in the community since November 24, 2011 and as a result the community and essential services had been affected. On November 30, 2011, the Regional Office reported that the contractor (DRACO) who had been repairing the damaged system advised that the water main was restored. The AANDC ON Regional Office reported that the First Nation community had received bottled water on November 30, 2011 and additional water will be provided if required. Northern Waterworks Inc. and the AANDC ON Regional Office will continue to work with the First Nation to rectify this situation. |
| Pikangikum | 2012-10-05 | Severe Weather - No Flood | No | On October 5, 2012, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that the community is experiencing numerous adverse affects from a large snow storm system which recently passed through the community. The First Nation community had been without power since 01:00 CDT, but it has since been restored. Additionally, there were concerns that the First Nation did not have enough fuel to power their generators through the weekend; however, the AANDC ON Regional Office has indicated that they have ample supply for the weekend, and have also arranged for additional fuel to be supplied. Several First Nations members have arrived at the community nursing station suffering from hypothermia after they were trapped in the storm and were forced to walk back to the community. The AANDC ON Regional Office confirmed that the nursing station is operational. |

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| Pikangikum | 2012-11-23 | Loss of Essential Services | No | At 23:45 hrs on November 23, 2012, the community lost power as a result of generator failure. The nursing station and Health Centre still had power but many homes were without heat. Much of the community also lost phone service. On November 26, 2012, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that 75% of the community has had its power restored entirely. The remaining 25% of the community was still experiencing 2 hour rolling blackouts. On November 26, 2012, Bell Canada accessed the community and restored telephone service. The Health Centre and the community's hotel were made temporarily available for those without power. On November 30, 2012, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that the water treatment plant was fully operational but that rolling blackouts continued in the community. On December 7, 2012, AANDC Regional Office reported that power has been 100% restored. |
| Pikangikum | 2016-11-22 | Loss of Essential Services | No | On 22NOV2016, a community-wide power outage occurred in the community, which also impacted the nursing station and telecommunications in the area. On 23NOV2016, power was partially restored to the community when the contractor Toromont repaired two of the community's three diesel generators. Additional parts were ordered for the third generator. The nursing station had no hot water, heat, and only limited lighting. Space heaters were used in the interim. On 24NOV2016, power and telecommunications were restored to the community. INAC will continue to work with the community and Toromont to ensure repairs to the generator are completed. Power was restored on 30NOV2016. |
| Pikangikum | 2018-05-23 | Wildland Fire | No | CONCERN OF WILDLAND FIRE - 23MAY2018: MB fire crossed provincial border. Provincial authorities and First Nations monitoring. 28MAY2018: Rain expected in area. 31MAY2018: This will be the final notification unless significant changes occur. |
| Pikangikum | 2018-07-20 | Wildland Fire | No | AT RISK OF WILDLAND FIRE - 20JUL2018: Smoke conditions have improved. Evacuation lists have been created should it be necessary to evacuate. |
| Poplar Hill | 2013-01-22 | Loss of Essential Services | No | On January 22, 2013, at approximately 15:00 EST, the Health Canada Zone Director advised that, due to a generator malfunction, there was no power to most of the community, including the Health Station and nurses' residence. While one back-up generator was operational, it was not strong enough to meet the needs of the entire community. Maintenance staff set up two portable generators to provide heat only to the Health Station and the nurses' residence. On January 25, 2013, the AANDC ON Regional Office indicated that power had been restored to the community. |
| Poplar Hill | 2018-05-23 | Wildland Fire | No | CONCERN OF WILDLAND FIRE - 23MAY2018: MB fire crossed provincial border. Provincial authorities and First Nations monitoring. 28MAY2018: Fire 60 km away. Limited suppression along fire's edge continues. Rain expected in area. 31MAY2018: This will be the final notification unless significant changes occur. |
| Sachigo Lake | 2011-07-19 | Wildland Fire | No | On July 19, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that the First Nation will be declaring an emergency. In addition, they are preparing a list of phase 1 residents (approximately 150 people). As of July 22, 2011, smoke conditions were improving. |
| Seinge River First Nation | 2014-06-20 | Flooding | No | On 20JUN2014, the First Nation advised AANDC that it is experiencing high water levels. On 21JUN2014, shipments of supplies arrived and eight crews are available to assist the community if need be. Emergency work commenced to close off the manholes that were experiencing flooding. The First Nation has secured two pumps to clean out the ditches and culverts. Pumps will remain on standby for use at the water/waste water plants. Pumping is underway in the low level areas of the reserve. Hydro One is to assess the hydro poles that are in the water. Sandbagging activities have stopped. As of 2JUL2014, water levels are decreasing. Two homes are being closely monitored, and the low lying area is being pumped to protect one home. Sandbags are being stockpiled. Water levels are estimated to take two weeks or longer to begin to recede to pre-flood levels. |

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| Slate Falls | 2011-07-11 | Wildland Fire | No | On July 11, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that a wildfire destroyed 40 hydro poles and seriously damaged an additional 40 along a 13 km stretch of the hydro line, resulting in a power outage. It is estimated that power will be restored around July 17, 2011. On July 12, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that MNR is working with Hydro One to clear fire hazard on power line cut by forest fire to allow repair crews to access sections of the power line in need of repairs. The AANDC ON Regional Office also reported that the First Nation had declared a state of emergency. The AANDC ON Regional Office is working with the community to provide for immediate needs. Cook stations will be set up outdoors for community use. On July 13, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that 8,000 Litres of bottled water, portable toilets, 32 portable cooking stoves, and 18 lanterns have been delivered to the community. In the event that it becomes necessary to evacuate the residents, they would likely be bussed to Sioux Lookout. On July 19, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that the First Nation continues to have no power. On July 22, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that power has been restored to the community. |
| Wahgoshig | 2018-07-22 | Wildland Fire | No | AT RISK OF WILDLAND FIRE - 22JUL2018: Smoke conditions have improved. Evacuation lists have been created should it be necessary to evacuate. |
| Wapekeka | 2013-06-23 | Wildland Fire | No | 23JUN2016: According to the AADNC ON Regional Office, provincial authorities have reported a forest fire 2 KM northeast of Wapekeka First Nation. Five cabins along the shores of Angling Lake have been lost to the fire. High to extreme burning conditions will remain in the area today. Four crews are on site working on the fire, values protection is in place. Fire crews will continue to stay on site until the fire is under control. There will be smoke in the community today due to wind direction however, it will not warrant an evacuation. The fire is expected to be under control by the end of the day. |
| Wawakapewin | 2009-08-14 | Loss of Essential Services | No | On August 12, 2009, the community lost communications and generator power due to a severe storm. As a result of the power outage, Chief Frogg issued a Declaration of Emergency on August 14, 2009. The Chief was concerned about food and water supplies should the power outage continue through the weekend. In addition, this community is on boil water advisory. As of August 18, 2009, the power and water systems was restored. Information was received from INAC regional office. |
| Wawakapewin | 2014-03-28 | Loss of Essential Services | No | AANDC Ontario Regional office reported that the First Nation declared a state of local emergency on 21MAR2014 as a result of water lines freezing in 14 out of 15 homes on-reserve. Northern Water Works Inc. has been working continuously to thaw the water lines, but has been unsuccessful so far as freezing has extended to water mains and septic systems. Residents are still able to access water and carry out essential tasks although several residents have voluntarily left the community due to the situation. As of 11APR2014, 5 or 6 members have chosen to remain in the First Nation during spring break up. Water remains limited to the bunkhouse and teacherage. The situation cannot be resolved until ice melts and a float plane is able to arrive. |

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| Wawakapewin | 2017-12-24 | Loss of Essential Services | No | <p>*Wawakapewin First Nation has declared a state of emergency on December 24, 2017 at approximately 16:45 due to failure of two diesel generators. *One generator is not functioning at all and the other will run for 2-5 minute increments, the biggest concern at this point is the water treatment plant and freezing of the lines. *The First Nation is trying to source a generator from Winnipeg, they will be looking to INAC for assistance. Phone, internet, power is sporadic at this time. *No request for provincial assistance has been made. *The winter road is not yet open, the closest community is Kasabonika Lake FN via a two hour ski-doo trip, each household has a wood stove and the ability to cook meals. *Three people are scheduled to return to the community on December 27th. * There is no request to evacuate, and they feel confident they could leave the community if necessary. *The biggest concern at the moment is the water pipes freezing, with no heavy equipment/excavator etc. in the community it would be an expensive and prolonged process to repair any damage. *On the evening of December 26, 2017 a request for federal assistance (RFA) was sent to Public Safety Canada (Government Operations Centre) from the Province of Ontario, the request was for assistance in transporting the generator from Kasabonika Lake to Wawakapewin and for activation of the Canadian Rangers. *The request for assistance will be amended today requesting assistance in transporting the generator from Pickle Lake to Wawakapewin as commercial aircrafts are not available to get it to Kasabonika Lake. *The RFA has been approved in principle and planning has started for both the flight and the deployment of the Rangers. *Toromont is currently in the community to attempt to restore power to the two existing generators. *MNRF will provide Ariel photos and satellite images of the community to DND to assist in their planning efforts. *Kasabonika Lake FN had delivered two barrels of fuel yesterday and Crystal is arranging for water, heaters, extension cords etc. to be flown in. . As of 4JAN2017 the work to install the rental generator went well, and technicians were successful in restoring water to the majority of residences. However it did have to be shut down due to several</p> |
| Webequie | 2018-05-28 | Wildland Fire | No | <p>CONCERN OF WILDLAND FIRE - 28MAY2018: Fire is 10 km away. Fire crews working on suppression. Rain expected in area. 31MAY2018: This will be the final notification unless significant changes occur.</p> |
| Weenusk | 2014-10-07 | Loss of Essential Services | No | <p>On 7OCT2014, the First Nation reported that it was experiencing fuel shortages affecting the diesel generating system which provides power to the First Nation. As of 10OCT2014, a two week supply of fuel has been delivered to the First Nation. A meeting with AANDC and the First Nation is scheduled in the week of 14OCT2014 in order to identify longer term strategies to prevent recurrence of this situation. Information was received from the regional office.</p> |
| Weenusk | 2018-06-11 | Wildland Fire | No | <p>* CURRENT WILDLAND FIRE - 11JUN2018: Fire suppression efforts are taking place. Forest fire ¼ mile from the community. 1 MNRF person on site fighting the fire with the community members. Fire is not close to airport should an evacuation become imminent. Sending up 2 fire crews, a radio operator and a belly tank operator. Chief reported they need additional help. 12JUN2018: Fire close to the community has been extinguished. Fire on the island continues to burn. Provincial fire crews have arrived. Winds are favorable; no smoke in the community. Freezing overnight, positive for fire behavior. Chief does not believe there is any need for a declaration of emergency at this time. 13JUN2018: Fire near community under control. No problems anticipated with fire on island. No smoke in community. No evacuation requested at this time. This will be the final notification.</p> |
| Wunnumin | 2013-01-24 | Loss of Essential Services | No | <p>On January 24, 2013, the community reported that both of their working generators had failed. A third generator has not been operational since December 2012. On January 30, 2013, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that two of the three generators have been repaired. The third will be repaired once cost estimates are received.</p> |

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| Attawapiskat | 2013-04-27 | Flooding | Yes | <p>Snow melt have caused overland flooding to approximately one third of the community. There have been overflows resulting in sewage spills and backups in homes and businesses in one third of community. Ditches were full and draining into the river. The Mushkegowuk Tribal Council conducted inspections of all affected units during the first week of May; of the 8 homes, 3 were deemed to have "severe" damage, and the remaining 5 had back-ups that were isolated to the sump pit in the basements. The 3 "severely" damaged homes were a part of remedial efforts in 2009-2010 when sewage backed up into 8 homes; of the 3 teacherages, 1 was deemed to have severe damage. First On Site, a disaster recovery company, has been engaged by the First Nation to provide a quote to restore the homes to pre-flood condition. Evacuees in Fort Frances will remain; however, a request was made to move them closer to home after 4 weeks. 261 evacuees from Thunder Bay were returned 16MAY2013. As of 17MAY2013, there are no further concerns regarding spring flooding due to ice break up. The First Nation will be receiving the scope of work and estimates for repairs to the homes next week, they will then contact AANDC to discuss. According to the First Nation, homes requiring minor repairs would take approximately 4 weeks, those that need major repairs would take an additional 4-6 weeks. At the request of Fort Frances an additional AANDC liaison will be identified to work with the host.</p> |
| Attawapiskat | 2014-05-16 | Flooding | Yes | <p>As of 15MAY2014, there is a high risk of ice jam related flooding and significant over-bank flooding. Water levels remain high. Potential host communities have been identified in case of need for evacuation. Emergency declared on 2014-05-16 at 13:00; due to high water and ice break-up risk in their community. The community of Attawapiskat FN has requested an evacuation of 956 Stage 1 evacuees on 2014-05-16. 956 Priority 1 - 16 May, as of May 20- 993 evacuees. 16MAY2014, a State of Local Emergency was declared due to high water levels and ice break-up. Between 16MAY2014 and 17MAY2014, approximately 336 priority 1 members were evacuated to the host communities of Kirkland Lake, Wawa, Fort Frances, Manitoulin Island, and Fort Albany. On 17MAY2014, provincial authorities conducted river surveillance and reported a significant ice jam extending 7 kilometres up river from the reserve. No flooding was reported on the reserve. Canadian Rangers were on patrol, monitoring, and assisting at the airport in Attawapiskat. Between 17MAY2014 and 18MAY2014, approximately 655 individuals were evacuated to Val d'Or, Rouyn-Noranda, and La Sarre. On 18MAY2014, the Department of National Defense assisted provincial officials with concluding the evacuation. The First Nation was reported to no longer be affected by flooding, as water levels dropped and the ice jam no longer posed a significant risk. On 19MAY2014, conditions remained the same, with 61 individuals remaining on the reserve. As of 20MAY2014, there are approximately 993 evacuees in total. Canadian Red Cross officials continue to provide support with registration of evacuees in host communities. Air quality testing is scheduled to take place on 21MAY2014, with repairs to follow by a contractor. Health Canada is working with the First Nation Chief to bring a nurse back to the First Nation. Repatriation of all evacuees will occur over the next few days. The repatriation of evacuees from Rouyn-Noranda is to be completed on 20MAY2014, and repatriation of evacuees from Val d'Or and La Sarre will take place between 20MAY2014 and 21MAY2014. Flood Watch remains in effect. The situation continues to be monitored. Repatriation of all evacuees began on</p> |
| Attawapiskat | 2014-12-01 | Environmental Contamination | Yes | <p>On 1Dec2014 the community declared a State of Local Emergency due to a leak of 1,200 liters of diesel oil within the hospital and near the health clinic. Ten long term care patients were evacuated. As of 5DEC2014, the health authority facilities are coordinating the assessment and mitigation of this incident. The hospital is closed but still staffed. The Council is concerned about the employees working either without protection or with simple face masks. The fuel spill was caused by a rupture of the secondary flex pipe containment. The medical clinic has remained open and was relocated to the Attawapiskat First Nation Health Services building. Medical evacuees are not eligible for EMAP funding. Patient evacuee costs will be funded by HC or the FN. According to the regional office, as of 27FEB2015, the hospital remains closed and is not likely to reopen until next year. The evacuation ended on 4APR2016.</p> |

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| Bearskin Lake | 2019-11-09 | Flooding | Yes | <p>2DEC2019: The last 48 evacuees repatriated from Sioux Lookout. This will be the final update for this event unless significant events occur. 1DEC2019: Repatriation from Thunder Bay complete. Repatriation from Sioux Lookout continues. 29NOV2019: Repatriation of 74 people from Thunder Bay under way. Repatriation from Thunder Bay and Sioux Lookout will continue over the weekend. 26NOV2019: Currently, Thunder Bay hosts 171 people and Sioux Lookout 189. 22NOV2019: An assessment of the ice jam will be undertaken this afternoon with a full report completed by tomorrow. 359 community members have evacuated, with 184 in Sioux Lookout and 175 in Thunder Bay. 19NOV2019: The last of the evacuees flew to Thunder Bay. Community members have indicated that water levels are receding. 18NOV2019: Flight canceled due to weather and safety. There are 27 people remaining to be evacuated. The Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry is pulling together a team of experts and plan on doing a surveillance flight as soon as possible. The Provincial Emergency Operations Centre has drafted a return home plan for when repatriation begins. Everything is going well in the host communities. 17NOV2019: The final thirty-nine evacuees are planned to evacuate 17/18NOV. Home checks and community maintenance by persons staying in the community are continuing. 16NOV2019: Community members continue to evacuate to Thunder Bay. It is estimated that approximately 30-35 people will be left in the community, including contractors and volunteers. 15NOV2019: Community members continue to evacuate to Sioux Lookout. The airport road has been repaired and is open for use. The community is requesting a hydrologic engineer to assess the ice jam and rivers to make sure it is safe to bring people home. It was also mentioned that during their flight they noticed that there is another ice jam forming up stream which could possibly affect Muskrat Dam. Follow up with Muskrat Dam First Nation will be done. 14NOV2019: Community members continue to evacuate to Sioux Lookout. Remaining evacuees will evacuate to Thunder Bay beginning 15NOV2019. 13NOV2019: The community begin to</p> |
| Brunswick House | 2010-05-27 | Wildland Fire | Yes | <p>On May 27, 2010, a wildland fire, approximately 80 km west of Chapleau, damaged hydro electrical poles and shut down the power supply to the town and three neighbouring First Nation communities: Chapleau Ojibway, Chapleau Cree, and Brunswick House. The power shut-down affected Brunswick House First Nations water treatment plant and its water supply as the community water treatment plant does not have a back-up diesel generator. The water supplies at Chapleau Ojibway and Chapleau Cree First Nation communities were not similarly affected. On May 27, 2010, Brunswick House First Nation notified the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources of its intent to evacuate 160 members from the community due to a lack of power and water supplies. The community members were evacuated to Sault Ste. Marie. The Ministry notified the Ontario Clean Water Agency (OCWA), which in turn notified INAC Ontario Region, on May 28, 2010. The INAC Ontario Region then approved the transportation and installation of a back-up diesel generator for Brunswick House First Nations water treatment plant. The generator was installed by noon on May 29, 2010. That same day at 14h00, Health Canada declared the water fit to consume. OCWA remained in the community to monitor the plant and continued testing the water until full power was restored in the community. OCWA has also been in regular contact with the Health Canada Inspector for the area. The Inspector was satisfied that the testing samples that OCWA provided were potable (drinkable); no boil water advisory was issued. According to the regional office, the residents returned to the community on June 1, 2010. The First Nation has expressed interest for INAC to cover the cost of the evacuation.</p> |

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| Cat Lake | 2011-07-11 | Wildland Fire | Yes | <p>On July 11, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that a wildfire burnt over 1.6 km of hydro lines resulting in a power outage to the Cat Lake, Mishkeegogamang & Slate Falls First Nations. In addition, due to the power outage, the Slate Falls First Nation water treatment plant became inoperable. On July 11, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that a wildfire destroyed 40 hydro poles and seriously damaged an additional 40 along a 13 km stretch of the hydro line, resulting in a power outage. It is estimated that power will be restored around July 17, 2011. On July 12, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that MNR is working with Hydro One to clear fire hazard on power line cut by forest fire to allow repair crews to access sections of the power line in need of repairs. The AANDC ON Regional Office also reported that the First Nation declared a state of emergency. The AANDC ON Regional Office is working with the community to provide for immediate needs. On July 13, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that the community has procured the items they deem necessary for the duration of the power outage. Water jugs and portable toilets were delivered and the Band has provided a generator for the nurse and police stations. The AANDC ON Regional Office also reported that 26 elders were being evacuated to Sioux Lookout due to water and sewage issues. On July 20, 2011, the AANDC Regional Office reported that 66 residents have been evacuated to Sioux Lookout and that the power continues to be severed. On July 22, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that power has been restored to the community. As of July 25, 2011, there are 101 evacuees in Sioux Lookout, an increase of 40. In addition, the community has returned its Elders back to the community. On July 26, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional office reported that all evacuees have returned home. In addition, the Chief has terminated the state of emergency. Evacuation1 - general, smok in community starting 8JUL2011</p> |
| Constance Lake | 2015-04-16 | Flooding | Yes | <p>On 16APR2015, the First Nation declared a State of Local Emergency due to rapidly melting snow causing overland flooding. Manholes and drainage systems were overflowing, and the lift station was unable to keep up with the amount of water, resulting in sewage back up and water in several homes. Approximately 40 people were evacuated locally. As of 20APR2015, the First Nation is managing the emergency; a new pump has been installed at the lift station, pump trucks were brought in to assist with remediation, and a boil water advisory issued before the flooding incident remains in place. Assessments are being done on approximately 13 homes. As of 24 APR2015, Pump trucks are no longer needed to assist the lift station but could be called back into action due to expected precipitation over the weekend. As of 28APR2015, the pump trucks are no longer necessary and the lift station is operational. As of 29MAY2015 there are 15 people remaining out of Constance Lake awaiting water testing results before repatriation. They expect to return next week. As of 19JUN2015, there are four people remaining out of Constance Lake and they are expected to return 19JUN2015.</p> |

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| Deer Lake | 2011-07-07 | Wildland Fire | Yes | <p>On July 6, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that smoke from several forest fires in the vicinity of Deer Lake First Nation was affecting the community. On July 6, 2011, the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) reported that the closest fire was only 2 km away from the Deer Lake First Nation airport. However, at this time, the threat remained the smoke. On July 6, 2011, AANDC ON Regional Office reported that the evacuation of Deer Lake First Nation priority 1 individuals was to commence at 21:00 CST. 478 residents have been identified as priority 1 individuals. On July 13, 2011, AANDC ON Regional Office reported that MNR is beginning the process of repatriating people back to Deer Lake First Nation from Greenstone. It is anticipated that 115 people will return July 13, 156 on July 14, and 204 on both July 15 and July 16, 2011. On July 13, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that MNR is beginning the process of repatriating evacuees back to Deer Lake First Nation from Greenstone. It is anticipated that all evacuees will have been repatriated by the end of the day, July 15, 2011. On July 18, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office indicated that a medical evacuation is required for five residents. On July 19, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that the First Nation will contact them and the EMO to arrange for the evacuation of phase 1 residents. On July 21, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office indicated that the evacuation of 550 Phase 1 residents had commenced and would be completed by July 21, 2011. The Host Community has not yet been indicated by EMO. As of July 22, 2011, there are 580 evacuees from Deer Lake First Nation. As of July 27, 2011, there were 525 evacuees from Deer Lake First Nation in Smith Falls. As of July 29, 2011, there were approximately 600-650 evacuees from Deer Lake First Nation in Smith Falls. As of July 29, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that all evacuees are tentatively scheduled to be repatriated starting on August 1 through August 3, 2011. On August 1, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that 179 of the remaining 525 evacuees are scheduled to return home from Smith Falls via Ottawa and Dryden today, leaving 346 in the host community. On August 3, 2011,</p> |
| Deer Lake | 2011-07-21 | Wildland Fire | Yes | <p>On July 7, 2011, Emergency Management Ontario (EMO) coordinated the evacuation of 543 residents to Greenstone (Geraldton) using Canadian Forces (CF) aircrafts. All evacuees were repatriated by the end of the day, July 15, 2011. On July 19, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that the First Nation contacted both them and the EMO to request the evacuation of Priority 1 residents. On July 21, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office indicated that the evacuation of approximately 550 Phase 1 was completed. On July 29, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that all evacuees are tentatively scheduled to be repatriated starting on August 1 through August 3, 2011. On August 1, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that 179 of the remaining 606 evacuees returned home from Smith Falls via Ottawa and Dryden, leaving 427 in the host community. On August 3, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that 263 evacuees were repatriated on August 2, 2011, and that the remaining 164 evacuees are scheduled to return home today.</p> |
| Eabamtoong First Nation | 2011-07-18 | Wildland Fire | Yes | <p>On July 17, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office indicated that the Eabametoong First Nation declared a state of emergency due to heavy smoke in the community and requested that Priority 1 residents be evacuated. On July 17, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that DND evacuated Priority 1 residents to the town of Greenstone (Geraldton). On July 18, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office indicated that approximately 1000 people remain in the community. As of July 25, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that the Eabametoong First Nation had also received a copy of the letter from the ADM/Chief of EMO saying it was safe to return to the community. However, the AANDC ON Regional Office is looking into this as MNR is responsible for determining when it is safe to return to the communities. On July 26, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that Eabametoong First Nation is prepared for the return of its community members. A verification to make sure all essential services are operational will be done prior to repatriation. As of July 27, 2011, there were 316 evacuees from Eabametoong First Nation in Greenstone (Geraldton). The AANDC ON Regional Office reported that all evacuees will be repatriated today. As of July 29, 2011, all 316 evacuees have been repatriated to their community from the host communities.</p> |

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| Fort Albany | 2014-05-08 | Flooding | Yes | As of 8MAY 2014, the Albany River is overtopping its banks and causing significant overland flooding in both First Nations. The Kashechewan airport has closed due to flooding. The causeway in Fort Albany is flooded. The Department of National Defense and the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources are working diligently to find aircrafts suitable to evacuate the First Nations. Provincial authorities are working to identify host communities and are currently looking at Toronto, Ottawa, London, Sudbury and Timmins in addition to Kapuskasing, Greenstone, Fort Frances and Matechewan First Nation, which are already prepared to receive evacuees. The logistics of this evacuation are challenging as there is less than 24 hours to evacuate both First Nations and a weather system is approaching the area. On 8APR2014, the Kashechewan First Nation reported that the ice jam that was causing overland flooding has broken and that the water from the river has flowed through. The First Nation requested that all its evacuees be repatriated. The evacuation of Fort Albany First Nation is continuing and Canadian Forces will be deploying two C-130 aircraft and five Griffin helicopters to the First Nation. 99 priority 1 members from the Fort Albany First Nation, and 34 from the Kashechewan First Nation were evacuated. The Department of National Defense and the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources were working diligently to coordinate a full evacuation of both First Nations. Shortly after, it was reported that the ice jam that was causing flooding had broken, that the water from the river had flowed through, and that evacuations were no longer necessary. As of 9MAY2014, all evacuees have been returned to both First Nations. State of local emergency declared - Stage 2 evacuation required |
| Fort Albany | 2015-04-27 | Flooding | Yes | As of 27APR2015, the First Nation is considering the evacuation of approximately 465 medical and stage 1 residents. The First Nation will be providing an update to their plans in an upcoming conference call with AANDC. On 29APR2015, 13 hospital patients were to be medevaced to health care facilities outside the community. No further evacuations have been planned to date. The community has identified 465 Stage 1 and 400 Stage 2 residents should an evacuation be required. On 3MAY2015, the causeway that connects the community to the airfield was closed due to flooding. On 4MAY2015, the First Nation terminated their State of Local Emergency. 5MAY2015, the Flood Warning was downgraded to a Flood Watch. As of 6MAY2015 the water levels have subsided over the causeway, the First Nation is now accessible between the mainland and Sinclair Island and all evacuees have been repatriated. On 7MAY2015, the Province of Ontario terminated their request for federal assistance. |
| Fort Albany | 2018-02-22 | Loss of Essential Services | Yes | Flooding (sewage blockage) (ON) – Albany First Nation (142) – 22FEB2018: The community has experienced flooding of six homes due to a sewage blockage. Families have been relocated to a local hotel. A restoration company is reviewing the physical damages in the homes and clean-up will begin next week. 25FEB2018: 29 affected community members were evacuated to Kapuskasing and an engineer was hired to assess damages, develop a recovery plan, and to renovate the sewage line so it does not freeze again. 28FEB2018: Jet pump attempts to unblock the sewage line were unsuccessful. The First Nation has begun excavating the sewage line. 2MAR2018: Fort Albany's excavator had mechanical problems on 1MAR2018 and began digging up the sewage line on 2MAR2018. Inspections of 6 homes and the Northern Store will take place on 3MAR2018. The final 2 evacuees will arrive in Kapuskasing on 2MAR2018 bringing the total number of evacuees to 30. Until it is determined how difficult it is to dig up the blocked sewage line and what is required to make the evacuated homes safe, it is unknown how long evacuees will remain out. Updates will be provided as information becomes available. 5MAR2018: Six homes require repairs, and repair times are estimated at five weeks. 21MAR2018: The sewage line has been emptied but there are difficulties keeping it clear. The line will need to be dug up and reinstalled at a proper depth. The engineering firm is testing homes for contamination. Estimated repair times are still five weeks. 29MAR2018: It was established that the sewage line cannot be fixed until July due to ground frost. The evacuees are now considered to be long-term evacuees and will be transitioned into rental homes or apartments by the ISC regional office. 27APR2018: The disinfection and clean up of homes is continuing and is almost complete. The problem sewage line continues to have blockages due to freezing and thawing of the line. ISC, the First Nation and professional engineers will be in the community next week to assess the situation for a solution to get people home. A long-term solution will also be developed. |

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| Fort William | 2013-05-20 | Flooding | Yes | The First Nation is experiencing flooding conditions due to heavy rainfall over the weekend. On Monday 20MAY2013, the First Nation, utilizing their own buses, evacuated 115 residents to Thunder Bay. There is extensive damage due to flooding to homes and road washouts. Flooding has receded. However, pumps continue to be used to assist with flooded basements. Safety assessments for flooded homes are underway. 92 community members have been repatriated, with the remaining 45 in hotels in Thunder Bay. All evacuees were scheduled to returned home on 7SEP2013. SOLE Declaration |
| Ginoogaming First Nation | 2014-09-19 | Environmental Contamination | Yes | On 19SEP2014, 20 homes were evacuated due to a damaged gas line, causing a leak. The line was capped on the same day and all evacuees were able to return home. |
| Kasabonika Lake | 2011-07-20 | Wildland Fire | Yes | On July 20, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that this community was a priority for a full evacuation of approximately 228 residents due to heavy smoke and nearby fire location. On July 21, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office indicated that 12 evacuees were transported to Thunder Bay. Of these, four were transported to Ottawa. On August 1, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that the four evacuees in Ottawa returned to their homes with the Kingfisher evacuees on July 31, 2011. However, 12 med evacuees remain in Thunder Bay for medical reasons. As of August 3, 2011, there have been no new developments. |
| Kasabonika Lake | 2013-05-22 | Flooding | Yes | The First Nation experienced flooding due to surface water from a nearby lake. State of Emergency was declared on 23MAY2013. Local authorities were concerned about possible flooding of critical infrastructure resulting in evacuations of 151 Priority 1 members on 25MAY2013. A community member committed suicide while family members were evacuated. In light of this, the Chief requested the early repatriation of evacuees. All evacuees were repatriated 30MAY2013. |
| Kashechewan | 2012-03-20 | Flooding | Yes | The Albany River is heavily blocked by ice jamming. The main concerns are the potential for the ice to jam at the communities that could cause flooding issues as a result of backed up water. However, there is no back-up of water as the water continues to flow through the ice jam. MNR reported that as of today, April 2, 2012, the situation remains stable. MNR reported that as of today, April 5, 2012, the situation remains stable. SOLE rescinded 31 March, 2012, evacuation-partial, road to lagoon is being repaired so that a small breach in the dyke in that location can be sandbagged. |
| Kashechewan | 2013-04-30 | Flooding | Yes | State of Local Emergency declared on 30APR2013. 337 members were evacuated to Kapuskasing, and an additional 304 Stage 1 residents were evacuated May 5, 2013. As of 8MAY2013, there was a total of 870 evacuees: 248 persons to Kapuskasing (mix of Stage 1s and 2s), 154 to Thunder Bay (stage 1), 98 to Greenstone (stage 1) and 370 Cornwall (stage 1). Approximately 40 housing units have been affected by flooding and sewage backup including the teacher's residence and the clinic. Once homes are stripped, cleaned and disinfected, evacuees can return during the renovation stage. The community will repair the sewage treatment plant and continue remediation of contaminated homes and buildings. The sewage treatment facility has been stabilized. Arrangements have been finalized between the Kashechewan Education Authority and the school board (Conseil scolaire des Grandes Rivières) for schooling for the 92 evacuee students in Kapuskasing. |

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| Kashechewan | 2014-05-08 | Flooding | Yes | <p>On 8MAY2014 the Albany River was overtopping its banks and causing significant overland flooding. 34 people were evacuated and then repatriated by 9MAY2014. 1312 residents were evacuated 11MAY2014, 1380 by 11MAY2014. A maximum of 1489 evacuees were dispersed to various locations, with 41 remaining on reserve to ensure the security and maintenance of critical infrastructure. On 12MAY2017, the First Nation requested assistance to protect the sewage treatment plant and lift stations. 198 repatriated on 17JUN2014. 566 repatriated on 18JUN2014. Flood watch remains in effect. 243 individuals from significantly damaged homes remain evacuated. Community no longer at flood risk as of 29AUG2014. As of 19SEP2014, 406 individuals remain evacuated. According to the regional office, there are 36 flood affected homes. The ring dyke's five gate control structures and three sewage lift stations also sustained damages. Update on long term flood evacuation (2014) status - barges with 11 housing modules on board arrived in Kashechewan on 2AUG2016 after a delay. As of 25NOV2016, 19 Kashechewan First Nation evacuees from the 2014 flood season have been repatriated. Additional repatriations are expected in the next few weeks.</p> |
| Kashechewan | 2016-04-29 | Flooding | Yes | <p>State of Local Emergency Declared – The precautionary evacuation of the First Nation due to potential flooding on the Albany River has commenced. The dyke system surrounding the Kashechewan First Nation has been assessed as ineffective against water and ice flows. There is no immediate threat to the Kashetchewan First Nation at this time. On 26APR2016, the Chief of the Kashechewan First Nation declared a state of emergency. Starting 29APR2016, flights will start evacuating 448 Stage 1 evacuees to Kapuskasing. Flights are expected to continue into Saturday, and Kapuskasing may be able to take additional evacuees. Thunder Bay has been identified as a second host community and will be able to host approximately 300 evacuees starting 2MAY2016. Additional host communities will need to be identified for the remaining State 1 evacuees (there are approximately 280 Stage 1 evacuees and 600-700 Stage 2 evacuees). Provincial Health and Social Services are prepared to facilitate services for evacuees. The First Nation is instructed to identify which assistive devices are required in Kapuskasing for evacuees. During the teleconference on 2MAY2016, the Chief asked the province to suspend all flights. The plan was to move approximately 98 stage 1 and 150 stage 2 evacuees to Greenstone/Geraldton. While 98 stage 1 evacuees were to stay in hotels, everyone else was to be hosted in an arena type of setting. Community members have voiced concerns over arena accommodations, indicating the inadequate washroom facilities, temperatures, and levels of noise. The first aircraft would arrive in Kashechewan at 12:15 pm on 2MAY2016. The INAC ON RDG will contact the Chief to clarify the situation and to ensure the safety of all residents. There are six flights planned for 3MAY2016 to transport evacuees to Wawa from Smooth Rock Falls. An additional 23 evacuees will be arriving on 3MAY2016 in Kapuskasing for a total of 427 evacuees in Kapuskasing and 325 evacuees in Thunder Bay. Two flights planned for 4MAY2016, which had the capacity to bring 82 people to Smooth Rock Falls, were canceled due to weather. As of 4MAY2016, the Chief expressed concerns regarding Lift Station #1. It has been</p> |

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| Kashechewan | 2017-04-14 | Flooding | Yes | <p>The community declared SoLE on 14APR2017. The annual evacuation of the Kashechewan First Nation commenced on 16APR2017 due to ice breakup occurring on the Albany River. A request for federal assistance from the Province of Ontario made on behalf of the First Nation was approved. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) tasked a Canadian Ranger Patrol Group to provide assistance with the evacuation of community elders and others requiring assistance and to assist with maintaining awareness of river conditions near the community. As of 17APR2017, 601 individuals were evacuated to the host communities of Kapuskasing, Thunder Bay, and Smooth Rock Falls. As of 18APR2017, the evacuation of approximately 230 stage 1 residents to Wawa and Kapuskasing is underway. The remainder of stage 1 individuals are scheduled to be evacuated to the host community of Hearst on 19APR2017. Additional flights to Cochrane will take place on 20APR2017. The Deputy Chief has requested all children and mothers be evacuated. A surveillance flight was conducted today on the Albany River and Kenagami River confluence (Albany Forks) by the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry. The Kenagami River (major tributary to the Albany River) is clear and free of ice and flowing well. The remaining upper reaches of the Albany River is also ice free and flowing well. The ice jam adjacent to the community is approximately 16 km in length, water appears to be moving under the ice and out to the bay. The community continues with snow removal and culvert cleaning in order to mitigate any surface water flooding due to melting snow. As of 20APR2017, 1,023 were evacuated to the host communities of Kapuskasing, Thunder Bay, Smooth Rock Falls, Wawa, and Cochrane. Flights being planned for Cornwall have been put on hold until Sunday. As of 20APR2017, nursing staff remain in the community, but teachers have already left as the school was closed for the annual hunt. The flows and water levels on the Moose River have decreased moderately. The flood coordinator in Kashechewan predicts the ice may start moving from the community on 20APR2017. The Deputy Chief has paused any further evacuation, will reassess river conditions on</p> |
| Kashechewan | 2018-04-19 | Flooding | Yes | <p>* EXPERIENCING FLOODING - Final call to review incident management 22MAY2018. - 19APR2018: Kashechewan begins annual flooding evacuations. Break up of ice is expected to create a high risk of flooding in the community. River surveillance flights have commenced. The First Nation is updating the evacuation lists and about 1600 residents are expected to be evacuated. The First Nation will send a declaration of emergency on 25APR2018, and from then evacuation flights to Thunder Bay, Kapuskasing and Timmins will commence. 24APR2018: SOLE is declared in anticipation of the precautionary evacuation. 26APR2018: Evacuations begin. The initial host community for the first 300 evacuees is Kapuskasing. Thunder Bay and Timmins are the host communities for the remaining evacuees. 27APR2018: Eight flights are scheduled to transport people to the host community of Kapuskasing. There are eight more flights scheduled to transport approximately 310 people to Thunder Bay scheduled for 28APR2018. The Canadian Rangers have been deployed to assist the evacuation. 28APR2018: Evacuation continues with 8 flights to Thunder Bay. 29APR2018: Remaining flights going to Timmins. 30APR2018: Final flight to Timmins. 4 Flights to Cochrane. Flights suspended for next 2 days due to weather. 2MAY2018: All flights suspended due to weather, will resume 3MAY2018 and complete the evacuation to Cochrane and Smooth Rock Falls. Next up is Hearst and Wawa. 3MAY2018: Some residents still returning from goose camps. Ice is still solid but water is flowing on top and some of the tributary rivers are breaking up. 284 people left in community. 5MAY2018: No flights this weekend because of the weather. 6MAY2018: Break up on the Albany River and major tributaries, flood warning issued. 7MAY2018: Province engaged Canadian Military assets to remove the entire community due to water rising close to level of the Dyke. Road to the airport is underwater and closed. 3 flights for 120 community members travelled to Hearst, Smooth Rock Falls, and Kapuskasing. 8MAY2018: Evacuation flights completed. Family reunification begins. 9MAY2018: Flood warning downgraded to flood watch. 10MAY2018: First Nation</p> |

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| Kashechewan | 2019-04-11 | Flooding | Yes | <p>Kashechewan (243) – ANTICIPATED TO EXPERIENCE FLOODING</p> <p>11APR2019: Kashechewan First Nation prepares annual flooding evacuations scheduled for 15APR2019. Break up of ice is expected to create a high risk of flooding in the community. Approximately 1600 residents are expected to be evacuated to Kapuskasing, Cornwall (NAV Canada), Thunder Bay and Timmins. Additional host communities are secured should any other James Bay First Nations require an evacuation for life and limb. 15APR2019: There is a slight increase of water levels on the Moose River. Kashechewan First Nation undergoes precautionary evacuation. 113 residents are evacuated and registered in Timmins, with more planned to arrive 16APR and 17APR. Kashechewan will also begin evacuating to Kapuskasing. Planning for resuming the regular education program for children within host communities is underway.</p> <p>16APR2019: The evacuation continues with two flights to Timmins and three flights to Kapuskasing. As of 12h00, Timmins has registered 291 evacuees with two additional flights in the afternoon. A Provision of Service will be completed by DND to activate the Northern Rangers to help out in the community. Due to potential flooding in southeastern Ontario, plans to send evacuees to NAV CANADA (Cornwall) are adjusted. The host community of Kapuskasing will continue to receive evacuees followed by Thunder Bay and then Cochrane rather than Cornwall. 18APR2019: DND activates the Northern Rangers 17APR. As of 17APR, 276 evacuees from Timmins have been registered by CRC. Seven flights to Kapuskasing are planned for 18APR. Once Kapuskasing has reached capacity, the next host community will be Thunder Bay, Cochrane and finally Timmins. Cornwall is no longer a host community for James Bay area evacuations as their rooms may be needed for Eastern ON flooding evacuees.</p> <p>23APR: Kashechewan is on Flood Watch as ice break up within the Albany River and its major tributaries may occur. 24APR2019: Four flights were completed on 22APR with four more on 23APR into Timmins. There are 1,500 residents evacuated (688 in Timmins; 501 in Kapuskasing; 202 in Thunder Bay; and 109 in</p> |
| Kashechewan | 2020-05-01 | Flooding | Yes | <p>19MAY2020: Flood risks on the Albany and Moose Rivers have been downgraded to LOW. This will be the final notification for Kashechewan, Fort Albany and Moose Cree First Nations unless conditions change. 17MAY2020: No significant precipitation was forecast for the next four days for the region.</p> <p>16MAY2020: The current conditions of ice breakup and snowmelt look favourable to push ice out into James Bay without causing significant flooding in the communities of Attawapiskat, Fort Albany, Kashechewan and Moosonee. 15MAY2020: Kashechewan still under precautionary declaration of emergency but will lift emergency declaration in the coming days. 11MAY2020: Water levels are down. Flood coordinator is closely monitoring the river. Camper's repatriation scheduled to start on May 13, 2020. Full re-entry estimated to take two weeks. 08MAY2020: Water slowly moving past the ice jam. No water at the airport or airport road. A surveillance flight occurred. 06MAY2020: The flood risk for Kashechewan FN and Fort Albany FN has been downgraded from HIGH to 'MODERATE to HIGH'. Elders within Kashechewan FN anticipate an easy break up. CAF Rangers are already activated and are conducting a river watch in Kashechewan FN. Approximately 800-900 people could require evacuation from Kashechewan FN if there is major flooding in the community as approximately 915 community members have moved to traditional hunting camps to avoid an evacuation. 05MAY2020: Conducted a river surveillance flight last night, break up has started at Hat Island with open water showing (approximately 100 km upstream) The Deputy Chief. Water is starting to rise, break up has commenced approximately 200 miles from the community, there are a number of campers 30 miles from the community and they will inform the leadership when the water reaches them so they can gauge when it will reach the community.</p> <p>01MAY2020: Kashechewan First Nation declared a state of emergency due to risk of flooding. Daily calls between Community/Provincial and ISC officials are ongoing. Flooding is expected to reach the community later in the week. Included in the declaration was a Request for Federal Assistance to purchase supplies</p> |

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| Kee-Way-Win | 2011-07-17 | Wildland Fire | Yes | <p>On July 16, 2011, MNR confirmed the fire is approximately 15 Km from the community, a reconnaissance flight over the area was planned for that day. This fire is also affecting the Sandy Lake First Nation. On July 17, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that a declaration of emergency was received from Chief and council. The evacuation of approximately 200 Phase 1 residents to the community of Greenstone has commenced on July 17, 2011. The evacuation is being organized by the MNR aviation unit. Emergency services in Greenstone has requested additional nursing staff for when the evacuees arrive, which will be accommodated. On July 20, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that the community has requested a full evacuation of the remaining 110 residents due to smoke conditions, with nine essential workers to remain in the community. On July 21, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office indicated that 111 additional residents were evacuated to Greenstone. In addition, nine essential workers remained in the community. As of July 22, 2011, there are 308 evacuees from Kee-Way-Win First Nation. As of July 27, 2011, the Kee-Way-Win First Nation indicated that the community's essential services are in place and that they are ready for the repatriation of their members. As of July 27, 2011, there are 308 Phase one evacuees from Kee-Way-Win First Nation in Greenstone (Geraldton) and 65 Phase two in Winnipeg; a total of 373. On August 1, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that all 65 remaining evacuees were returning home from Winnipeg today. Over the week-end, approximately 308 evacuees returned home. This will be the final notification for this event unless significant developments occur. Evacuation1 - general</p> |
| Kingfisher | 2011-07-21 | Wildland Fire | Yes | <p>On July 21, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office indicated that 261 individuals were evacuated to Ottawa on July 20, 2011. Additional evacuees were expected. On July 27, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that all essential services are currently operational in the community. As of July 29, 2011, there were 287 evacuees in Ottawa. On July 29, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that approximately 180 evacuees are tentatively scheduled to be repatriated on July 30, 2011 and the remaining (107) tentatively scheduled to be repatriated on August 1, 2011. On August 1, 2011 the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that the remaining evacuees left Ottawa at 8h00 EST. However, three evacuees remain in Ottawa for medical reasons.</p> |
| Mattagami | 2012-05-23 | Wildland Fire | Yes | <p>On May 21st the Provincial Emergency Operations Centre reported that Mattagami First Nation is being threatened by the Kirkland Fire #8. The First Nation community immediately began preparing for an evacuation. For example, the community arranged to have buses on stand-by from Sudbury to be used to support the evacuation of community members that do not have their own transportation. On May 22, 2012, a series of large forest fires in Northeastern Ontario caused the evacuations of areas near Timmins and Kirkland Lake. Emergency Management Ontario (EMO) has advised that Mattagami First Nation will be evacuating On May 23, 2012, the First Nation declared a State of Local Emergency. During the afternoon of May 23, 2012, Timmins # 9 Fire became extremely active forcing the evacuation of 150 residents from the Mattagami First Nation. 118 evacuees have been sent to Kapuskasing hotels (54 at Mattagami Inn, 34 at Apollo Inn, and 30 at Park Inn). An additional 32 evacuees are staying with family and friends in Timmins, Gogama and Sudbury. In Kapuskasing, evacuee registration took place at the municipal Civic Centre and was conducted by the Canadian Red Cross (CRC). May 23, 2012. On May 23, 2012, 33 First Nation members (including the Chief and 2 Band Councillors) decided to stay in the Mattagami First Nation to assist with value protection. The Ontario Provincial Police is providing 24-hour security patrol of the community. On May 24, 2012, the 33 individuals who had chosen to stay in the community, left due to heavy smoke presence and concerns of loss of safe road access. On May 25, 2012, Highway 101 which is the main route out of the community, was closed. MNR reported that the fire has not progressed since May 24, 2012. It remains approximately 6 km away from the community. On May 25, 2012, the Town of Kapuskasing has declared a state of emergency as a host community. An AANDC Liaison Officer (LO) is present in the community to assist with evacuees' needs. On May 27, 2012, due to improved conditions, repatriation plans were developed. MNR approved the return of a team of 10 First Nation members, including fire crews and water technicians, to ensure that the community's</p> |

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| Mattagami | 2013-04-29 | Flooding | Yes | <p>Mattagami First Nation is experiencing flooding conditions due to seasonal melting of the snowpack along the Mattagami River (and Porcupine Lake) causing a rapid increase in water levels. This increase threatened to washout the only access road to the First Nation. Provincial authorities stated that the river flows will continue to increase for at least the next 48 hours, gages on both ends of the river show it rising. Provincial authorities agree with the Chief that the risk of the only access road washing out is moderate to high. An AANDC Liaison Officer will be in the community today, May 2, 2013, to assist. The First Nation has sandbags and open culverts in place; however, water is spilling over onto the road and bypassing culverts. Law enforcement partners are monitoring the road and turning back heavy traffic. Emergency Management Ontario has alerted the Ontario Ministry of Health and Ornge (Air ambulance) should the road become impassable, as there is a helipad in the community. The community currently has all the supplies they need and access to emergency services on both sides of the washout. 67 Phase 1 residents were evacuated to Timmins, Timmins is also preparing for potential flooding. Evacuation arrangements made by the First Nation. All Evacuees repatriated May 4, 2013.</p> |
| Mattagami | 2018-07-09 | Wildland Fire | Yes | <p>* RISK OF WILDLAND FIRE - 9JULY2018: 3 fires in close proximity to First Nation. Provincial authorities are in contact with Community, who has not yet requested assistance. 12JUL2018: Community experienced some smoke related issues, however this has subsided. Daily meetings are occurring to plan for potential evacuation. Vulnerable residents identified and a boat shuttle service has been arranged. 13JUL2018: 1 vulnerable individual has been evacuated. Health officials monitoring remaining vulnerable residents. Community prepared for full evacuation. All fires under control. 14JUL2018: Rain helped with fire suppression efforts. No immediate concerns. 16JUL2018: First Nation reported some smoke in the community. Vulnerable members continue to be monitored. • Mattagami First Nation evacuated one family for one night—evacuation cost \$507.28 (in our earlier response, this was incorrectly reported as evacuation of one individual from Temagami First Nation; there in fact was no evacuation from Temagami in July 2018.). See 52056719 GCDOCS. Note, one family on-reserve in Ontario is usually 2.9 persons according to the 2011 Census. ORIGINAL TEXT INCORRECTLY REPORTED IN THE WEEKLY: 19JUL2018: There are now 33 fires in the northeast region, 16 are not under control, 22 are being held. Smoke values are low today in the community who has reported that the situation remains status quo: they continue to monitor community members with breathing issues and maintain the information office. Medically vulnerable returned home. Final Notification. CORRECTION 30JUL2019:</p> |
| Mattagami | 2019-06-09 | Wildland Fire | Yes | <p>Mattagami First Nation (226) – EVACUATION ALERT - 09JUN2019: Timmins Fire 2 (Tim2) is located 4 km from the town of Gogama and 20 km from Mattagami FN. The Chief declared SOLE due to smoke in the community. Evacuation alert is in effect, the community is fully capable of self-evacuation. Approximately 100 vulnerable residents are identified; approx. 70 people who evacuated have since returned home as the fire outlook is positive. ISC works closely with the community. 10JUN2019: The fire is approximately 5,000 ha and provincial authorities make good progress on the fire. Firefighters protect powerlines from the fire. Hwy 144 closed south west of Gogama; evacuation is possible as highway remains open northward. Population of Mattagami: approximately 169 // 11JUN2019: Fire behaviour is minimal; no smoke is present in the community. No concerns regarding value protection. Mattagami has downgraded their evacuation alert status; declaration of emergency is maintained until 15-16JUN2019. 13JUN2019: Evacuation alert is lifted. This is the final notification unless significant developments occur.</p> |

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| Mishkeegogamang | 2011-06-22 | Wildland Fire | Yes | <p>On June 17, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that a forest fire referred to as "Sioux Lookout 35" was burning 20 km east of New Osnaburgh (Mishkeegogamang First Nation) and 20 km southeast of the Township of Pickle Lake. On June 21, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that a smoke alert had been issued for the Mishkeegogamang First Nation, due to strong winds from the east. On June 21, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that a conference call was held between EMO, the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR), Mishkeegogamang, AANDC and Health Canada. As a result, a declaration of emergency had been submitted by the Mishkeegogamang First Nation. On June 22, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that 81 priority one evacuees have been evacuated to Sioux Lookout. On June 22, 2011, MNR reported that the fire is currently 16-20 KM from the community. In addition, it is approximately 21,200 hectares in size and is considered not under control. On June 22, 2011, AANDC ON Regional Office reported that the Chief of Mishkeegogamang First Nation requested the assistance of the Canadian Rangers. This request was approved by AANDC. As a result, the GOC requested that Canada Command deploy sufficient military personnel to assist with the voluntary evacuation of residents to central evacuation points. The AANDC ON Regional Office also reported that easterly winds were forecasted to bring smoke into the community until approximately 4h00, on June 23, 2011. It was also forecasted that the winds would change to the north or northeast, away from the community. MNR has deployed an Incident Command Team, including a liaison officer, to the fire area. The Canadian Rangers were on the ground assisting with the evacuation. The AANDC ON Regional Office also reported that a general evacuation had been issued for the community. The AANDC ON Regional Office reported that 81 priority one evacuees have been evacuated to Sioux Lookout. An additional 54 evacuees had arrived in Sioux Lookout at 20h30. At 22h45, 184 additional evacuees were en route to Sioux Lookout. Another 104 evacuees have been evacuated to Ignace. The Canadian Red-Cross (CRC) have been assisting</p> |
| Mishkeegogamang | 2011-07-11 | Wildland Fire | Yes | <p>On July 11, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that a wildfire destroyed 40 hydro poles and seriously damaged an additional 40 along a 13 km stretch of the hydro line, resulting in a power outage. On July 12, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that MNR is working with Hydro One to clear fire hazard on power line cut by forest fire to allow repair crews to access sections of the power line in need of repairs. On July 21, 2011, the AANDC Regional Office reported that 61 residents (approximately one quarter of their Priority 1 list) have been evacuated to Sioux Lookout and that the power continued to be severed. On July 22, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that power has been restored to the community. On July 26, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional office reported that all evacuees have returned home. In addition, the Chief has terminated the state of emergency.</p> |
| Mitaanjigamiing First Nation | 2014-06-20 | Flooding | Yes | <p>State of Local Emergency declared. FN is protecting the water/wastewater treatment plant with a wall of sandbags and pumps. Some shoreline erosion and docks submerged. One individual with health issues has been relocated with the support of Health Canada. Pumping at lift station continues. Provincial official supporting with the procurement of supplies. Once weather improves, the FN will visit the affected homes to conduct damage assessments. The community's main access road was damaged and repaired by the Province.</p> |
| Moose Cree | 2013-05-08 | Flooding | Yes | <p>On 8MAY2013, the Ministry of Health assisted with the evacuation of 23 persons from the Moose Factory Island Hospital. The community has indicated that no further evacuations are required at this time. As of 13MAY2013, the Moose River has dropped and is no longer a concern.</p> |

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| Nibinamik First Nation | 2017-08-10 | Wildland Fire | Yes | <p>WILDLAND FIRE On 10AUG2017, it was reported that a forest fire is currently burning approximately 11 km north of the community and provincial officials are assessing and developing a plan of action to protect structures. On 13AUG2017, it was reported that the fire is continuing to burn 10km from the community producing heavy smoke which is expected to persist for some days. On 12AUG2017, the community requested a general evacuation due to the high risk caused by the extended power outage, high temperatures and heavy smoke which force community members to remain indoors. As of 13AUG2017, 205 people have been evacuated to Kapuskasing and 30 people have decided to remain in Thunder Bay. 7 band members, firefighting crews, electricians and a Health Canada nurse remain in the community to fight the fire and restore power. As of 14AUG2017, the fire threat is low but heavy smoke remains. The First Nation and INAC are pre-planning repatriation. As of 15AUG2017, the First Nation and INAC have determined that before repatriation can begin, the water plant, sewage plant and power plant must all be operational, food will have to be brought in, and homes inspected. Health Canada will inspect the community prior to repatriation. As of 16AUG2017, there is no smoke in the community but it is expected to return on 18AUG2017. As of 17AUG2017, smoke conditions are variable and depend on the wind but are generally improving. Repatriation planning is ongoing. Electricians and the water plant operator arrived in the community on 17AUG2017 to ensure all systems are operational. As of 19AUG2017, smoke conditions are improving and repatriation planning is ongoing. As of 20AUG2017, the water treatment plant and sewage lift stations are fully operational. Preliminary plans are being put into place for the return of approximately 100 people on 21AUG2017, which will include priority staff. If all goes as planned, repatriation should be complete by 22AUG2017. The Matawa Tribal Council is organizing a food delivery on 21AUG2017 and INAC will work with Ontario Works to replenish refrigerators and freezers impacted by the power outage. As of 21AUG2017, there is no smoke in the community. Four repatriation</p> |
| North Spirit Lake | 2011-07-18 | Wildland Fire | Yes | <p>On July 17, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that this community declared a state of emergency. Plans were put in place to evacuate approximately 200 people in the morning of July 18, 2011. On July 18, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that 200 residents were evacuated to Greenstone (Long Lac). In addition, Hydro One indicated that the power would be severed until July 22, 2011. On July 19, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that the evacuation of phase 1 residents was completed the previous evening. In addition, the First Nation requested a medi-vac for one Elder. There are 118 residents who remained in the community. As of July 25, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional office reported that the North Spirit Lake First Nation had also received a copy of the letter from the ADM/Chief of EMO saying it was safe to return to the community. However, the AANDC ON Regional Office is looking into this as MNR is responsible for determining when it is safe to return to the communities. On July 26, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that North Spirit Lake First Nation is prepared for the return of its community members. A verification to make sure all essential services are operational will be done prior to repatriation. As of July 27, 2011, there were 211 evacuees in Greenstone (Longlac), 9 evacuees in Thunder Bay, and 4 evacuees in Winnipeg; a total of 224. On August 1, 2011, there were 2 evacuees in Greenstone (Longlac), 7 evacuees in Thunder Bay, and 4 evacuees in Winnipeg; a total of 13. Over the week-end, approximately 209 evacuees returned home. On August 3, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that all 13 remaining evacuees were repatriated on August 2, 2011.</p> |

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| Pikangikum | 2019-05-30 | Wildland Fire | Yes | <p>Pikangikum (208) – PARTIAL EVACUATION - 30MAY2019: Pikangikum's Chief and Council issued a Band Council Resolution to declare a SOLE on 29MAY2019 due to impacts of smoke on vulnerable community members. A large jet stream has move large amounts of smoke from Alberta fires to Northwestern Ontario. Winds light and variable over the next 12-24 hours which will increase smoke impact on the community. In addition, there is a fire 5 km outside of the community. Provincial firefighters are currently attacking the fire with water bombers, creating a large amount of smoke, which is reaching the community. Suppression efforts are continuing and the fire is not expected to reach the community. Additional fire crews and water tankers are to arrive. Residents have attempted to cross the lake to get to their vehicles but have been unsuccessful due to large amounts of smoke and the fast spreading fire. The Department of National Defence, through Public Safety, is coordinating with provincial officials to evacuate the vulnerable residents of the community (1,600 out of 4,000) as soon as possible. Both provincial and DND air assets are currently being deployed to the community for the evacuation of all residents. Provincial air assets used to repatriate Kashechewan evacuees may be diverted to assist with Pikangikum evacuation. A formal Request for Assistance has been submitted by the government of Ontario to the Minister of Public Safety and the Minister of National Defence for federal air assets and Canadian Rangers. Canadian Rangers advised they would require at least 12 hours before they could be in the community once the RFA is received. The first flight to evacuate is expected to fly to Kapuskasing today. Thunder Bay has agreed to take on flight hub operations for all other flights which significantly reduces the flight time to evacuate residents. A number of communities have agreed to host evacuees: Kapuskasing, Thunder Bay, Timmins, Cochrane, Hearst and Sioux Lookout. Group accommodations will be set up to ensure all evacuees are accommodated quickly. The Provincial Emergency Operations Centre (PEOC) is coordinating emergency response with their agencies as well as with ISC, the Department of</p> |
| Pikangikum | 2019-07-04 | Wildland Fire | Yes | <p>Pikangikum (208) – MONITORING FIRE - 04JUL2019: The northern portion of the Red Lake 39 fire continues to work its way northward burning up against the west shore of Pikangikum Lake. The fire is approximately six kilometers southwest of the community on the opposite side of the lake. This fire is managed by an Incident Management Team as part of a larger cluster of fires. 05JUL2019: The fire Red Lake 39 is approximately 10 km from the community. Extreme fire behavior is expected until 10JUL2019, with little relief from the smoke. Due to significant smoke drifting into the community and the proximity of the fire, the Chief will declare a state of local emergency. An evacuation of the most vulnerable community members (approximately 2,200) has been requested. This will be the second evacuation of Pikangikum First Nation since the last of the evacuees from the first evacuation returned home on 17JUN2019. 05JUL2019: The availability of accommodations for the FN residents is currently a challenge; Kapuskasing is the only host community so far that has identified beds for Pikangikum residents (520). 06JUL2019: RED 39 is out of control and covers approximately 18,000 ha. It is located approximately six km southwest of the community, on the opposite side of the lake. Five flights are planned for today which will airlift approx. 216 people to the host community of Kapuskasing. IFNA has arranged for resources to support the host communities, this includes councilors and health services. The Independent First Nation Alliance (IFNA) will set up an Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) in the community. Two Field Officers from the Office of the Fire Marshal and Emergency Management (OFMEM) are in the community and the Canadian Rangers have been activated to help with the evacuation. Communications are partially restored however, some challenges remain. 07JUL2019: Six flights are planned for today, five private and one Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) the destination is Kapuskasing and Hearst. All aircraft are in a two hour holding pattern due to the smoke, until things improve it is very doubtful that any aircraft will get into the airport. By Monday afternoon into Tuesday a system is expected to move into the region</p> |
| Wawakapewin | 2011-07-22 | Wildland Fire | Yes | <p>On July 22, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that there have been 20 community members evacuated to Smith Falls. On August 1, 2011, the AANDC ON Regional Office reported that all evacuees are scheduled to return home today.</p> |

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